

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 25.Oct.99		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED THESIS
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ENHANCING AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY: A STRATEGY FOR ACTION			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) 2D LT WELCH CHRISTOPHER S				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) HARVARD UNIVERSITY			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AFIT/CIA, BLDG 125 2950 P STREET WPAFB OH 45433			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER FY99-356	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unlimited distribution In Accordance With AFI 35-205/AFIT Sup 1			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)				
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approved for Public Release Distribution Unlimited </div> <div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">19991116 103</div> </div>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 64	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	

Executive Summary

This study first examines the nature of conflict in Africa, possible interventions, and the shortcomings of Africa's current peacekeeping capacity. It then outlines a strategy for the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) to foster both *effective* and *legitimate* peacekeeping capacity in Africa. This is accomplished by first identifying strategic objectives, then determining channels of action that can help achieve those objectives. "Targeting" of specific countries helps make these action channels more effective.

Nature of conflict: Africa is plagued by a lack of coincidence between nation and state, autocracy, corruption, chronic poverty and societal divisions. Africa of the 1990's has seen extreme violence and horrendous human rights violations, primarily from intrastate conflict. It has also suffered challenges to fragile democratic regimes. Economic and resource motives for conflict are common, and violence is facilitated by a general erosion of sovereignty in many countries and readily available weapons.

Possible Responses: "Peacekeeping" is a generic term that has lost much of its specific meaning. Military intervention can be usefully separated into 1) operations that occur with the consent of the parties and 2) those that are undertaken without consent. Consensual interventions include traditional peacekeeping, limited humanitarian intervention, and the implementation of comprehensive settlements. Non-consensual interventions, in contrast, include what we call 'robust' humanitarian intervention as well as peace enforcement.

Ideal form: Given the nature of conflict, consensual interventions would ideally be undertaken by the UN, with participation of African states through the UN Standby Arrangements. Given the UN's lack of willingness or ability to launch non-consensual operations, such operations—if they are to be conducted—fall largely to African sub-regions or ad-hoc groups. These interventions, because of their challenge to the norm of sovereignty and the potential for self-serving motives, should be subject to several constraints, such as international (UN or OAU) authorization and inclusion of UN or OAU monitors to ensure the peacekeepers themselves adhere to international norms.

Capacity shortcomings: Capacity shortfalls plague both consensual and non-consensual interventions. These include insufficient training, equipment and interoperability as well as

concerns over legitimacy. For non-consensual interventions, limited lift and mobility capability are an additional constraint. Current bi-lateral training initiatives are generally successful in addressing these shortcomings but their scale is still absolutely minimal.

Formulating a DPKO Strategy

The second part of our report highlights two broad goals related to enhancing African peacekeeping capacity:

- **Improve effectiveness:** The current initiatives lay the ground work for establishing effective African peacekeeping capacity. This can be done by expanding current initiatives which requires freeing additional *Western resources* and increasing *African participation* and “buy in” in the programs.
- **Improving legitimacy:** This entails developing trigger mechanisms and authorization channels. This will necessitate an increase in the capacity of sub-regional organizations and the OAU, in particular their communication with the UN and the development trigger mechanisms and authority structures within and between the organizations.

We then detail the **obstacles** to achieving these goals—including limited donor state resources, African hesitancy toward fuller participation, and the weak capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations. Next, we suggest a number of **strategic objectives** that should be born in mind in order to overcome the obstacles.

Strategic objectives to address Western reluctance to increase funding

- Increase visibility of the issue
- Enhance legitimacy of trigger mechanisms and authorization capacity
- Increase coordination among initiatives to avoid overlap

Strategic objectives to address African hesitancy to participate

- Enhance African “ownership” in the development/coordination of initiatives
- Maintain close links to the UN
- Signal long-term Western commitment
- Increase coordination of training initiatives (which helps to alleviate the fear of further dividing the African continent along linguistic lines)

Strategic objectives to enhance legitimacy

- Focus on developing trigger mechanisms and authorization capacity within internationally trusted institutions
- This will only happen if the OAU and sub-regional organizations are significantly strengthened and if close communication is maintained with the UN

Bearing these strategic objectives in mind, we further develop a strategy for DPKO action. First, we identify the appropriate “targets,” or those UN member states and (sub-)regional organizations that have the most “potential” for contributing to the enhancement of our strategic objectives. Second, we explain the importance of ‘sequencing’ as part of developing a strategy, that is, determining which actors, institutions or changes on specific issues may influence the decisions of our target. We then identify those actors and institutions that (1) may influence our target decision makers directly or who may have an influence on specific issues that our target decision maker cares about and (2) over whom the DPKO may hold some influence. We then discuss the ‘Action channels’ through which DPKO can exert its influence or otherwise achieve its strategic objectives.

The specific action channels include:

- Plenary session and working group meetings
- Conferences and meetings
- High-level meetings, such as a UN Summit and Ministerial level meetings
- Internet and web page
- Direct communication channel and closer working mechanism with other bodies within the UN

For each of these action channels, we provide specific recommendations for how the DPKO can make the best use of them to achieve its strategic objectives, and thus further its goals of enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of African capacities for peacekeeping.

ENHANCING AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPACITIES

Developing a Strategy for Action

Presented to:

Col. Peter Leentjes

**United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Training Unit**

POLICY ANALYSIS EXERCISE

Daniel A. Christensen, Soo Young Kim, Christopher S. Welch

**Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government**

ADVISOR: PROFESSOR SHELLY LEANNE
PAC SEMINAR LEADER: PROFESSOR KALYPSO NIKOLAIDIS

April 1999

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION	2
2 THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA	3
2.1 STARTING FROM BEHIND: THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT	3
2.2 THE FACE OF CONFLICT IN THE 1990's: A BLOODY MESS	4
3 WHAT CAN BE DONE?	7
3.1 TYPES OF INTERVENTION	7
3.2 INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA: THE IDEAL AND THE REAL	11
3.3 CURRENT CAPACITY-BUILDING INITIATIVES	14
4 FORMULATING A DPKO STRATEGY	16
4.1 GOALS, OBSTACLES, AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	16
ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS	16
<i>Western resources</i>	17
<i>African participation</i>	18
ENSURING THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE	19
4.2 FROM STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES TO ACTION	21
4.3 TARGETING MEMBER STATES AND REGIONAL/SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	21
AFRICA	22
DONOR STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS	24
4.4 SEQUENCING	26
4.5 ACTION CHANNELS	27
PLENARY SESSIONS AND WORKING GROUP MEETINGS	28
<i>Influencing the structure of negotiations</i>	29
<i>Influencing the process of negotiations</i>	31
<i>Final recommendations for the DPKO</i>	33
HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS	33
ACADEMIC CONFERENCES	35
INTERNET RESOURCES	36
COORDINATION WITH OTHER UN DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES	37
<u>APPENDIXES:</u>	
I: Current and Planned Activities and Programs	38
II a: Analysis of Relevant peacekeeping actors	41
II b: Background information on relevant peacekeeping actors	44
III a: Analysis of the Most Important African Countries	48
III b: Basic Facts of the Most Important African Countries	51

1 INTRODUCTION

The African continent is plagued with violent conflict. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were absorbed in armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and producing more than 8 million refugees and displaced persons. These conflicts have clearly undermined efforts to foster long-term stability and prosperity in Africa, but have wider consequences as well. They often aim at the destruction of civilians and entire ethnic groups, and have the potential to spill across borders. As noted by Kofi Annan, "Preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself."¹ The failure to adequately address the human tragedies—most stunning in Rwanda—is a grave reflection on African leaders, the United Nations, and the international community.

This study seeks to examine the causes of this failure and to propose corrective measures which can be of use to the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). First, we will examine the nature of conflict in Africa and explore the range of options for dealing with such conflict. Next, we determine who can best intervene. Finally, we develop a strategy to be used by the DPKO to facilitate an increase in African capacities for peacekeeping.

¹ Kofi Annan, "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa," (United Nations, S/1998/318, 13 April 1998), p.3.

2 THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Conflict in Africa is both common and devastating. It has affected the lives of millions of people and has squandered resources desperately needed for more productive endeavors such as economic development. It is also very complex; the full range of underlying and precipitating causes for conflict throughout the continent cannot be distilled into a simple checklist. Still, it is useful to focus on commonalities and to examine how the general nature of conflict in Africa undermines efforts to foster stable peace.

2.1 Starting from behind: the roots of conflict

Lack of coincidence between nation and state: During the period of rapid de-colonization in the 1960s, the UN General Assembly quickly ratified African borders, most of which had been arbitrarily established by the Colonial Powers at the Congress of Berlin in 1885. These borders divided many natural communities and lumped disparate peoples together, often resulting in states with little sense of national identity or unity.

Corrupt states: Too often, “national unity” was pursued through centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism. Such practice can be seen as a continuation of the Colonial legacy of repressive political systems and personalized/centralized power (used to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources). Predictably, such political monopolies often led to corruption and the abuse of power. State building and access to the government helped fill the pockets of the “in group.”

Chronic poverty and Societal divisions: The “winner takes all” mentality—regarding the distribution of wealth and resources, patronage, and the prerogatives of office—is exacerbated both by the relative

scarcity of economic resources and the foundation of political parties based on ethnic, regional, or religious affiliations. Given the multi-ethnic character of most African states, and the common perception that a given community's security or survival can only be ensured if that group controls the government, conflict becomes almost inevitable. This is especially true in the context of centralized power noted above, where corruption, lack of transparency, lack of peaceful means to change the political leadership, repression of minorities, lack of respect for human rights, and little respect for the rule of law tend to ensure that membership in the "losing" category is exceptionally distasteful.²

Unique situations: A number of factors are also of importance to particular sub-regions. In Central Africa, for example, the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas is key. In Rwanda, multiple waves of displacement have produced confusion over land ownership rights. In North Africa, ideological tensions regarding visions of society and the State create sources of actual and potential conflict in some states.

2.2 The face of conflict in the 1990's: a bloody mess

Extreme violence and human rights violations: African conflicts tend to be exceedingly violent, with the ever-present potential for genocide or other grave violations of human rights. Violence is often directed toward civilian populations, resulting in large-scale suffering and in large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Africa has also witnessed a growing trend in the use of child soldiers.

Intrastate conflict: Serious conflict over state borders has largely passed, thanks in part to the 1963 decision of the Organization of African Unity to accept the boundaries inherited from the colonial powers.

² Ibid., p. 4.

Despite the remarkable scarcity of interstate conflict in Africa, *intrastate* conflicts have been abundant. Recently, Africa has seen 20 or more civil wars each year.

This is not to say, however, that outside parties are absent. Outside states or parties may seek to influence events (either suppressing or sustaining conflict) within a given state for reasons of ideology, resources, security, etc. State disintegration, for instance, is rarely contained within borders. Refugees, armies, and precedent all flow across typically porous African borders. The post-genocide flow of refugees from Rwanda led to instability and conflict in eastern Congo, which in turn drew several other states to intervene in Congo.

Resource/economic motives: Despite the devastation that armed conflicts brings, there are many that profit from chaos and lack of accountability. Far from seeking to resolve the conflict, they may actually seek to stir trouble. Of obvious note are arms dealers/smugglers as well as those interested in unregulated access to resources such as diamonds, timber or oil. The protagonists themselves may also have little interest in peace, especially if “peace” entails giving up access to vital resources. Often, such resources represent both the ends and the means for continued conflict.

Erosion of sovereignty and “failed states”: Long economic crisis has eroded the resource base of many governments, and has diminished some states’ ability to maintain government presence (police, tax collectors, etc) in many rural areas. This process of state decay has been exacerbated by “donor” states that have redirected their aid from Cold-War African proxies (e.g. Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire) to states that are actually achieving some economic or political success. “Without external economic and political support, few African regimes could sustain the economic lifestyles to which they had become accustomed, or maintain the permanent hold on political power which they had come to expect.”³

³ Ibid., p. 4.

Challenges to such weakened states have been facilitated by easy access to weapons—cheaply available after the Cold War and readily passed along from conflict to conflict throughout the region. This has expanded the scope of potential players. For example, before 1986, when Yoweri Museveni took power in Uganda with the assistance of a rebel force he gathered and trained in the bush, military takeovers had originated within national armies and were essentially palace coups. Since then, rebel forces from outside the government have challenged African governments in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville, and Chad.

Conflict within such weak states can sometimes lead to a complete collapse of the state apparatus. Though still uncommon, this type of emergency is growing in prevalence. In Somalia, in 1991, the Barre government was overthrown but no other group was powerful enough to succeed it and Somalia descended into chaos and warlordism. Certain periods during the conflicts in Liberia and Zaire also witnessed governments that had lost control of much of their countries.

Challenges to democratic regimes: Across Africa, several conflicts threaten fragile democracies. Ironically, the very process of democratization has sometimes increased instability. Over three dozen multiparty elections have taken place across the continent since 1990; some were rigged by insiders or thugs, while others have produced a genuine turnover. Some new governments have faced challenges from groups that (often accurately) perceive continued governmental corruption or failure to provide for some segments of the population. Perhaps even more dangerously, “new leadership” also implies the creation of a cohort of disgruntled former-leaders that tend to retain significant numbers of soldiers and weapons, and the accompanying capacity for disruption. Despite the typically questionable extent of “free and fair” elections, the overthrow of ostensibly democratic regimes can have spillover effects for the region and continent and for the international community in general.

3 WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Efforts to resolve or mitigate these grave conflicts have proved to be remarkably challenging. The elusiveness of clear success stems, in part, from difficulties associated with both the nature of the intervention and the actors who perform the intervention. These two elements are examined below.

3.1 Types of intervention

Although the following discussion focuses on interventions directly related to *conflict situations*, it is important to place such interventions in the broader context of efforts aimed at fostering peace and security in Africa. Many actions can be taken before or after outbreaks of active conflict to help address the underlying concerns of potential protagonists. Preventive diplomacy, for instance, can help bring parties to the negotiating table and achieve wider political or economic participation. Economic development can help relieve the resource scarcity that perpetuates conflict. Preventive troop deployments can help prevent a violent outbreak or prevent a conflict from spreading across borders.

The following section examines the range of options for addressing situations of ongoing conflict or the implementation of a cease-fire or peace accord. Such actions are commonly referred to as “peacekeeping” operations, but this now-generic term masks a tremendous amount of variation within possible missions. Unfortunately, this loose terminology tends to obscure or confuse discussions of peace and security. Below, we have separated the most common variants of “peacekeeping” into two broad categories: those with consent, and those without.

Interventions with consent:

- **Traditional peacekeeping:** This type of action occurs only in a permissive environment with a cease-fire and the consent of the parties. Its most common form is the interpositional force, which may occupy a demilitarized zone between two previously warring states. It may give breathing space for parties to sort out their differences at the negotiation table. Impartiality is essential for these operations, as they operate with the consent of the parties and are meant only to facilitate a peace process. These operations are typically authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and troops may only use force in self-defense.
- **Limited humanitarian:** Given a situation of ongoing conflict, humanitarian relief can mitigate the impact on civilians (by providing food, medical relief, etc.) and perhaps reduce the number of refugees. While not a “traditional” action, the delivery of humanitarian and relief supplies, equipment, and personnel into conflict areas is becoming more common. The parties to the conflict often allow aid workers access to local populations.
- **Implementation of comprehensive settlements:** If the parties do sign comprehensive peace accords, peacekeepers may be used to implement a multidimensional operation in support of the accord. Peacekeepers may be used, for instance, to help demobilize and disarm combatants and to train and restructure national police. In Africa, such missions have been carried out in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia. But such situations will likely entail only “partial consent,” as African conflicts often involve multiple parties with loose chains of command. Peacekeepers will need to be prepared to defend themselves.

Interventions without consent:

- **Robust humanitarian:** Unfortunately, “consent” for humanitarian aid is also often partial or nonexistent, especially when one or more of the parties to the conflict are irregular militias. Additionally, relief supplies (food, clothing, etc) can serve to prolong a conflict if they are diverted to the parties directly involved in the conflict, and the lives of aid workers can be placed in jeopardy by looters. Thus, it may be important to have aid convoys and distribution protected by military personnel.

In situations of gross humanitarian violations or genocide, military units may provide “safe areas” where civilians can receive shelter and humanitarian assistance. If “safe areas” are to be effective, the troops must be given a strong enough mandate to fend off attacks (the counterpoint being the weak mandate in Bosnia and the resulting terribly-dangerous “safe areas”). This robust humanitarian assistance may not mitigate the conflict itself, but could potentially save many lives and prevent a true humanitarian catastrophe, such as that seen in Rwanda.

- **Peace-enforcement:** An intervention designed to physically interrupt the fighting is of a completely different nature from the types of intervention noted above because it requires significantly more force, more political will, and must pass a higher test of international law and support to be deemed legitimate. Such peace-enforcement might aim to preemptively seize or destroy arms caches, separate the parties in conflict, actively disarm the parties, maintain secure control of the country side, push a junta out of the capital (in the case of an armed revolt or coup d’etat against a democratic government), etc. Active intervention of this sort was desperately needed in Rwanda to prevent genocide, and in eastern Congo-Kinshasha, to prevent the human devastation after the humanitarian operations along the border with Rwanda had concluded. Examples of actions taken include the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) action in Sierra Leone and the US operation in Somalia. These actions obviously require a greater commitment of

force, and entail a correspondingly high risk. History provides sufficient detail of the difficulty of “putting down” tenacious guerilla movements.

These difficulties notwithstanding, peace-enforcement can be viewed in two ways. First as an *emergency fix*—an “in and out” operation—to address the immediate symptoms (the threats to peace and security) of the conflict. Alternatively, peace-enforcement can represent a more determined, time-consuming effort to create “breathing space” during which fundamental defects within states can be addressed in a more comprehensive manner, including political, social and economic reconstruction. Such commitment to “nation building” is extremely rare in the international community, due in part to its high cost, long time-commitment, and uncertain outcome.

Questions of sovereignty: Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations allows the Security Council to authorize non-consensual military action necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”⁴ Still, the principle of sovereignty, and its corollary of non-intervention, creates a high bar for the determination of an *international* threat. The precise actions that should trigger intervention, of course, are not universally agreed upon. Large-scale flows or refugees across borders, the potential for the fighting itself to spill across borders, and the overthrow of a democratically elected government may suffice. Contained civil-war usually does not. Genocide, however, even if fully contained within borders, *does* justify action (in fact *obliges* action, according to the Genocide Convention). It is an act that, if allowed to continue unchecked, threatens the very fabric of international society.

⁴ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Article 42.

3.2 Interventions in Africa: the ideal and the real

The UN, by virtue of being the global organization with responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security and its long track record in peacekeeping, is the most broadly accepted and capable organization to mount consensual peacekeeping operations. If the Security Council mandates a mission, the UN can bring to bear significant financial, administrative, and command/control resources. The UN also experimented with the notion of robust humanitarian operations in the early 1990s, but the Security Council—after Somalia—seems to have lost the political will for such operations; this hesitancy was clearly displayed by the failure to act in Rwanda. Moreover, the UN lacks the ability to coordinate and deploy a true enforcement action which could sustain combat operations as might be needed to rout out rebels or stop a genocide. Given the UN's shortcomings, and the unlikely prospects of radical Security Council reform or restructuring, the UN will simply fail to meet many of Africa's security concerns. This points to the need for the development of an African capacity to deal with African crises.

Within Africa, the OAU is widely regarded as legitimate, but chronically incapable of decisive action. This is due as much to its nature as a consensus body as to perpetual resource and staffing shortages. The OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and Prevention could probably coordinate monitors for a classic peacekeeping operation, but can not field or coordinate a non-consensual enforcement action. If such robust action is to be taken, it seems likely that responsibility will fall on sub-regional organizations or ad-hoc coalitions of willing states.

Sub-regional organizations vary widely in their ability to conduct military operations. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), which have the most potential, are dominated by individual states (active Nigeria and reticent South Africa, respectively). Action by a small number of—or individual—states tends to raise problems regarding legitimacy, as it becomes easier to mask self-serving interests under the cloak of “humanitarian” or “security” interests.

Ideal African approach:

Given the UN's limited ability to address crises in Africa, an appropriate African approach for dealing with conflicts of the nature discussed above would look something like the following:

- **Interventions with consent:** Consensual operations should be conducted by the UN, with participation of African states through the UN Standby Arrangements. If the UN fails to act, such consensual operations could in theory be carried out under the aegis of the OAU (preferably with a UN authorization/mandate and continued contact and coordination throughout) by sub-regional organizations or a coalition of willing member states.
- **Interventions without consent:** Non-consensual operations for peace-enforcement and robust humanitarian operations will fall primarily to Africa, but should be subject to several constraints. They should proceed only in the face of a "true" threat (i.e. one that is recognized by a preponderance of African states) to international peace and security, which would include gross humanitarian violations and genocide. Sub-regional organizations or coalitions of willing states should coordinate with the OAU (when the OAU is not incapacitated by its need for consensus) and should receive UN authorization. Where possible, UN Monitors should co-deploy with the mission to ensure adherence to international norms. Unilateral actions should be avoided due to concerns over legitimacy.

Real capacity shortcomings:

In fact, African ability to carry out military interventions is questionable in terms of both **effectiveness** (the actual capacity to conduct and sustain operations) and **legitimacy** (safeguarded by the proper functioning of an appropriate authorization/coordination mechanism):

- **Interventions with consent:** Even if African troops operate only in a permissive environment as part of a UN force, effectiveness is often limited by insufficient training, equipment, and interoperability.

A lack of experience participating in multinational operations (both at the tactical and the headquarters level) is also key. These problems make participation in multinational UN or African-led missions very difficult. Many forces do not yet meet the standards needed to participate in the UN Standby Arrangements (although UN Standby Arrangement teams can help states identify their equipment shortages and seek "partnerships" to help secure the needed equipment during an operation).

Questions of legitimacy are raised by the OAU's limited ability to authorize and oversee such operations. Additionally, a shortage of working contacts between sub-regional organizations and the UN limit coordination and the likelihood of receiving a UN mandate or support for an all-African intervention.

- **Interventions without consent:** If African forces are to participate in non-consensual operations, the concern over effectiveness is even greater. Problems with sustainability and the nature of the force are paramount. Without significant UN or Western assistance, most African operations will lack the guarantee of resources to get the troops to the area of operations and support them in theater for a significant period of time. This would take financial backing as well as material resources, particularly lift/mobility capability (which is particularly scarce in Africa; even South Africa has a very limited projection capacity). But without such resources, sustainability—and thus credibility—are severely undercut.

Even if such problems could be overcome, African forces would still seem small in number—almost hopelessly small when considering that Africa is usually engulfed in multiple crises and that large numbers of troops would be needed to secure Africa's potentially huge areas of operation (often compounded by a dearth of roads and infrastructure). African forces also lack the sophisticated/specialized units needed for effective operations (e.g. engineers, demining units, medicine and health units, higher level communications units, air support, and psychological

operations). These problems seem to suggest that Africa will be unlikely to develop a fully autonomous non-consensual peace enforcement capability.

Non-consensual operations will also challenge the generally weak capabilities of sub-regional organizations to trigger and coordinate intervention. These organizations have limited contact with the UN, which would hamper their ability to gain UN authorization.

3.3 Current capacity-building initiatives

Many of the capacity concerns noted above are currently being addressed by bilateral training initiatives. These initiatives are summarized below (and examined in more detail in Appendix I). Several Western countries have initiated bilateral training and assistance programs. The largest of these initiatives is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), launched by the United States, with a yearly budget of about \$40 million (compare this to the \$20 million unit cost of an F-16 fighter plane or with the \$2 billion unit cost of a B-2 stealth bomber). The UK maintains a military training team in Zimbabwe, which they hope will become regional, in addition to supporting a training center in Ghana. France is planning to set up a similar facility in Cote d'Ivoire. A number of smaller countries, notably Belgium, Canada, Italy and the Nordic countries, have also been active participants, though on a smaller scale (see Appendix I for details on current initiatives). A recent \$9 million grant by the Danish government has helped establish a regional training center for peacekeeping in Harare, Zimbabwe. About 16 African countries have expressed willingness to participate in the initiatives for enhancing their peacekeeping capacities.

In general, these initiatives have focused on increasing the ability of African forces to participate in consensual peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The US has focused on battalion level (roughly 600 troops) training in an effort to increase basic soldiering skills, professionalism, and interoperability (i.e. equipment that meets international standards) so that African forces can more

effectively participate in multinational operations—particularly through the UN Standby Arrangements. Many African forces can benefit greatly from training in basic soldiering skills such as small unit movement, and marksmanship. Such training is critical for self-defense even in a “consensual” environment. Soldiers also benefit from training specifically related to peacekeeping, such as human rights and international law education, interaction with NGOs, etc. Multinational exercises have proved useful, both for the troops on the ground and for the headquarters level experience.

French initiatives have focused more on the command/control level and have sought to bring sub-regional actors together for joint exercises, highlighting the French belief that the ability to cooperate internationally is crucial for conducting peacekeeping operations. The U.K. has taken a similar approach, focusing on upper echelon training to enhance deployability and command/control. Efforts are also underway to create sub-regional and regional (cross-lingual) training and exercises. Several large exercises (such as “Blue Crane” have already taken place).

In sum, the current training initiatives seem to be obtaining their objectives of increasing the capacity of African forces to participate in peacekeeping operations. However, the scale of this success has been limited, particularly in addressing shortages of equipment, interoperability, and financial resources. As mentioned above, African capacity for non-consensual operations is especially limited, both in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. Almost no effort has been directed toward increasing the capacity of regional organizations to coordinate or support such operations. To address these shortfalls, the following section will develop a strategy intended to further increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of African peacekeeping capacity.

4 FORMULATING A DPKO STRATEGY

4.1 Goals, obstacles, and strategic objectives

The UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) is uniquely placed to help address the shortcomings noted above, as it can help facilitate dialogue between donor and recipient countries, and help develop and endorse specific training initiatives. The remainder of this paper will develop the outline of a DPKO strategy to achieve two primary goals that directly contribute to the general aim of enhancing African peacekeeping capacities:

- Enhancing **effectiveness**
- Ensuring the **legitimate use of force**

Enhancing effectiveness

In general, the failure to achieve more profound effectiveness with the training initiatives stems from two fundamental problems: 1) limited Western resources and 2) African hesitancy toward fuller and more active participation. First, limited Western commitment of resources constrains the potential scale and scope of the training. The current combined yearly contributions of about \$60 million (with approximately \$40 million from the US and \$6 million each from the UK and France) can perhaps usefully be compared to the equivalent value of three F-16 fighter aircraft (approximately \$20 million each) or to the billions of dollars spent by Western countries in Bosnia. Substantial increases in African capacity will require increased commitment of Western resources. Increased Western resources are especially necessary if a peace-enforcement capacity (which the donor countries have so far shied away from) is to be achieved. But Western assistance for enhanced effectiveness in this area will not—and should not—increase without corresponding improvements in legitimacy (addressed in more detail

below) aimed to help assure proper use of that force. It is essential that military capacity should not outpace efforts to ensure its legitimate use.

Second, African reluctance toward fuller participation also has clear impacts on the scale and scope of training, since African states must provide the soldiers, most of the equipment, and a willingness to develop the institutions and infrastructure necessary to effectively and legitimately field and coordinate their forces. In recognition of these problems, the following discussion examines the obstacles and strategic objectives related to both freeing Western resources and increasing African participation in peacekeeping.

Western resources

- **Obstacles to freeing Western resources:** The limited nature of Western support for training (and other) initiatives in Africa stems from real resource constraints. These constraints generally stem from political considerations and from a determination of the national interest which generally does not stress Africa's strategic importance. Some states also fear getting too involved in the seemingly hopeless conflicts of Africa. Western resources are also limited by a very real concern about the legitimacy and appropriateness of increasing African capacity. Few policy makers want to be seen putting more "firepower" in to the African powder keg.
- **Strategic objectives:**
 - **Visibility:** Increased visibility of the crises in Africa, as well as the potential security benefits of increased African capacity, may make it easier for the public and policy makers to devote more resources to Africa.
 - **Legitimacy:** Western concerns about the legitimate use of African force must be addressed before significant increases in aid can be expected.

- **Coordination:** Increased coordination of ongoing initiatives can help reduce overlap and waste to get the most capacity per dollar spent (i.e. efficiency).

African participation

- **Obstacles to greater African participation:** African reluctance to more fully participate (recognizing that commitment to participation varies greatly throughout the continent) has several roots. Many African states and organizations are skeptical about Western intentions. Some fear abandonment by the international community. They see training initiatives as a convenient way to pawn-off responsibility for peacekeeping in Africa and understand that the effectiveness of military intervention in Africa will be severely limited without Western involvement. Many African states also fear neo-colonialism or excessive and paternalistic Western-involvement in Africa (quite understandable given capricious ex-colonial interventions—often motivated by Cold War interests—even after independence). Few African states are eager to increase their sense of dependency on the West, which could undermine their sense of national sovereignty and self-determination. Neo-colonialism could, for example, lead to ethno-linguistic divisions in the continent—if the French train only their own former colonies and the British do likewise. This may also disrupt the African balance of power. Some states are also distrustful of their neighbors and do not want to allow increased military capacity. Some leaders undoubtedly fear that increasing the strength of their own military could disrupt the political-military balance within their country. Many states would also prefer to focus their efforts on other matters, such as economic development.
- **Strategic objectives**
 - **African ownership:** African states and organizations should feel some “ownership” of the initiatives. This can be achieved by involving them in the formation and coordination of initiatives and in the decision making process.

- **Links to UN:** Maintaining the UN's primary responsibility for international peace and security is essential. Whenever possible, African interventions should be within the context of UN operations or with UN authorization. This lends legitimacy to the operations and also keeps the UN and the West involved in African conflict resolution.
- **Coordination:** Increased coordination of bilateral training initiatives can help alleviate African fears of continental divisions and would signal a more serious, concerted effort on behalf of the developed world to address Africa's security challenges.

Ensuring the legitimate use of force

If African states are to play a more active role in robust-humanitarian and peace-enforcement operations, concerns over legitimacy must be also addressed. Legitimate use of force is important for many reasons, particularly so that operations adhere to international law and some conception of ethical action. Ensuring legitimate action also helps prevent wars of aggression or meddling, thus preventing regional disruption and assuaging Western anxiety regarding the nefarious use of force (and thus helping to free the resources needed to sustain such a capacity).

The UN, and the West in particular, will always be hesitant to support or authorize military action by states with poor records of respect for human rights or adherence to democracy and international norms. Few states in Africa have unblemished records, but many are struggling to enhance democratization. This is a slow and arduous process, but it should not be outpaced by military capacity buildup. Rapid increases in military capacity may serve to undermine such democratization and might be used for illegitimate purposes. There is no easy solution to this problem, and it will likely serve as the limiting factor in the provision of Western military training and assistance.

- **Obstacles to the legitimate use of force:** Ensuring that operations “on the ground” are legitimate (i.e. adhere to international norms, especially regarding human rights and the Geneva Convention) is made difficult by a general lack of training—for both soldiers and commanders—in international law and peacekeeping doctrine; although several current initiatives do address these points, significant variation exists among and within nations. Challenges also arise from the fact that soldiers are often poorly paid and may face exceptionally violent and grueling conflict situations—which together may give rise to natural instincts of self preservation.

The legitimacy of decisions by individual governments to use force—especially in unilateral interventions—may be undermined by narrow self-interest, disregarding international law and institutions. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of well-functioning regional or sub-regional organizations which, at least in theory, could help authorize or coordinate such action.

- **Strategic objectives**
 - **Appropriate training:** Training should emphasize professionalism and civilian control of the military. Soldiers should receive specific training in international law and human rights. Behavior in the field can also be observed by UN or OAU monitors to ensure adherence to international norms.
 - **Trigger mechanisms:** Trigger mechanisms, while not absolute rules, should be discussed and examined in an effort to reach a general consensus on when it is appropriate to intervene in African crises. For instance, when do “simple” humanitarian violations become “gross” violations of human rights or genocide? What level of refugee flow, or what level of internal chaos, represent a threat to surrounding states?
 - **Authorization, communication and coordination:** International authorization through the UN is important for ensuring legitimacy and guarding against nefarious objectives. UN or OAU monitors can also play a key role in ensuring legitimacy. Unfortunately, the UN is often slow and reluctant to grant such approval. Improved communications between the UN, OAU, and sub-

regional organizations (including liaison officers, staff exchanges, etc.) would help improve the flow of information and facilitate UN authorization in appropriate circumstances.

- **Strengthening regional and sub-regional organizations:** If states do decide to intervene, they can do so through ad-hoc coalitions, sub-regional organizations or the OAU. Regardless, significant effort must be directed toward strengthening these organizations' capacity if they are to play an important coordinating or authorizing role for African peacekeeping.

4.2 From strategic objectives to action

To further the strategic objectives described above, the DPKO needs to formulate a coherent strategy. This requires first **targeting** the person(s) or institution(s) that can act on a given issue (e.g. the British Foreign Minister regarding additional resource contributions). Second, unless it is possible to contact and convince that person or institution directly, the DPKO needs to think about '**sequencing**'. This identifies consecutive points of leverage (e.g. determining who can influence the Minister, then who or what can influence *that individual*, and so on) eventually leading back to a person or process that the DPKO can influence directly. Finally, the person or process through which the DPKO can act directly is what we refer to as the **action channel**. The remaining sections of this paper address these issues in turn.

4.3 Targeting Member States and Regional/Sub-regional Organizations

The key decision makers with regard to the goals we identified are member state governments and their officials or diplomats. But obviously, not all states are equally able to provide resources or equally valuable as participants in initiatives to enhance their capacities for peacekeeping. Below, we will identify those states and organizations that seem to have the greatest potential for contributing to the

DPKO's goals of enhancing effective and legitimate peacekeeping in Africa (detailed analysis and country data can be found in Appendix III A and Appendix III B).

Africa

For *African countries*, we have defined 'potential' as the possession of military capacity, legitimacy and political will:

- **Capacity** regards the strength of the military compared to other countries in the sub-region. We assume that a country with a strong existing military capacity allows donor-funded training to focus on specific peacekeeping training, with less need for initial basic training, thus saving scarce donor resources.
- **Legitimacy** regards to what extent the country is seen as a legitimate potential peacekeeping force in its sub-region (i.e. a country with a democratic government based on the rule of law, respecting human rights and other international norms).
- **Political will** is defined as the likelihood that the current government of a given country will agree to participate in regional peacekeeping efforts.

West Africa: Nigeria clearly dominates West Africa in terms of capacity and it has recently become more legitimate with the election of its civilian president. In terms of capacity, Cote d'Ivoire is definitely weaker than Nigeria, while it seems somewhat stronger than Ghana and Senegal. Cote d'Ivoire seems to have a high level of legitimacy in the eyes of its sub-region, although it seriously lacks political will. The political will of Nigeria in the future seems somewhat uncertain, but the political will of Ghana and Senegal is high. Finally, ECOWAS plays a prominent role in regional peacekeeping and will be strengthened by its recent restructuring, but it is hampered by differences between its largest member states Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, the latter of which has traditionally been suspicious of anglophone countries in the region.

	Capacity	Legitimacy	Political will
Nigeria	High	Med./High	High but uncertain
Cote d'Ivoire	Medium	High	Low
Ghana	Medium?	High	Med./High
Senegal	Medium	Medium	High

Southern Africa: While South Africa is even more dominating economically in its region than Nigeria is in West Africa, it is much less dominating militarily. Zimbabwe is its closest contender for regional influence, and the South African-Zimbabwean rivalry seems to undermine SADC in the same way that the Nigeria-Cote d'Ivoire rivalry undermines ECOWAS. However, SADC, like ECOWAS has a large proven potential for seriously contributing to enhancing the peacekeeping capacity in its sub-region. Botswana, Zambia and Malawi are all smaller than Zimbabwe, but generally seem more legitimate in the eyes of their neighbors, especially given Zimbabwe's questionable military involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Botswana, with its high level of political will and effective capacity seems for the moment to have the most potential after South Africa as a regional peacekeeper.

	Capacity	Legitimacy	Political will
South Africa	High	Med./High	Medium
Zimbabwe	Med./High	Med./Low	High
Botswana	Medium	High	Med./High
Zambia	Low	Medium	High
Malawi	Low	High	Medium

Eastern and North-Eastern Africa: Egypt seems to have very large capability, but little legitimacy or political will (because of their focus on the Middle East). Kenya has some capability and also has legitimacy, but lacks political will. Ethiopia and Uganda are both too involved in their own wars to be

serious candidates for a regional peacekeeping role, although Ethiopia's large military capacity may prove useful in the future, when the conflict with Eritrea is over. Finally, the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGAD) both seem to be capable of playing an important future role in regional peacekeeping, although both are currently very weak organizations.

	Capacity	Legitimacy	Political will
Egypt	Very high	Med./Low	Low
Kenya	Medium	Med./High	Low
Ethiopia	High	Low	Low
Uganda	Medium	Low	Low

Conclusion: The countries with the most potential seem to be Nigeria, South Africa and possibly Egypt if it can overcome its problems with legitimacy and political will. Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Kenya seem to be important secondary players. The remaining African countries, Zambia, Malawi, Ethiopia and Uganda seem to have less potential at the moment for making useful contributions to African peacekeeping. In terms of sub-regional organizations, ECOWAS and SADC clearly seem to have the most potential at the moment, although the EAC and IGAD may acquire serious potential in the longer term.

Donor States and Organizations

We define 'potential' for donor countries as the ability and willingness to deliver financial and other resources to contribute to peacekeeping. We measure this by examining which donor countries have the highest national income, which countries have the strongest historical ties to Africa, and finally by which

countries deliver most in terms of foreign aid, which could indicate existing concern for the well-being of African countries.

We have previously determined that the US, UK, France and the Nordic Countries currently are the main contributors to enhancing African capacities for peacekeeping at the moment. Appendix I provides a comprehensive list of all the countries that currently contribute as well as an overview of these activities. Which other states have good potential for contributing to enhancing African capacities for peacekeeping?

Some of the richest countries in the developed world in terms of total GDP and GDP per capita are obviously the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK. These countries thus have potential as donors simply given their preponderant wealth. If we look at another measure of 'potential', namely historical ties with Africa, the US, UK and France will again be prominent, with the addition of Belgium and Portugal. A third measure would be to look at which Western countries currently are the top contributors of development aid to the 13 countries that we analyzed above. Such countries, if they do not already contribute to peacekeeping in Africa, could potentially be convinced to take a more 'balanced' approach to their foreign aid spending, using some of the money on peace and security.

Germany and Japan figure prominently besides the US, the UK and France in terms of traditional foreign aid. Of the 13 African countries we identified above, Japan and Germany are the top contributors of foreign aid to almost six of the 13 countries (see Appendix III B for specifics). For the remaining seven African countries, the top foreign aid contributors are the US, the UK and France. Thus, Germany and Japan seem to have a similar interest in the well-being of Africans as does the US, the UK and France, even though Germany and Japan currently contribute much less to efforts at enhancing African peacekeeping capacities.

In one country, Botswana, the European Union provided more aid than any single UN member state. However, the EU is in a similar position as Japan and Germany: it has many resources, but is constrained in giving aid in the field of military security.

Conclusion: Besides the US, UK, France and the Nordic countries, which are already well engaged in peacekeeping training activities, Germany, Japan, Belgium and Portugal, as well as the EU, seem to have good potential for becoming major donors in the future if well targeted by the DPKO. Germany, Japan and the EU all share a similar reluctance for involvement in foreign military affairs, but it is well possible that they in the future could be convinced to contribute in indirect ways, for instance by contributing to the DPKO Trust Fund.

4.4 Sequencing

After determining the important targets, the next step for the DPKO is to determine how those targets can be influenced to ensure their participation and support. Sequencing is a process of determining the links in a possible "chain of influence" going from the DPKO, through (perhaps several) intermediate actors, and finally to the target that the DPKO ultimately wants to influence.

When this chain of influence is recognized, one can overcome the possible resistance of a specific actor in two ways. First, targeting the strongest parties first can help secure compliance among weaker parties because the leverage of those stronger parties that have initially been targeted can be brought to bear against the resistance of weaker parties. Thus, by targeting especially Nigeria and South Africa, both of which have a huge influence in their respective sub-regions, getting these countries 'on board' may in itself help get buy-in from the remaining countries in their sub-regions. (In the case of Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, which generally *do not* tend to defer to Nigeria and South Africa but view themselves as their rivals, the influence of their main Western military allies, France and the UK could effectively be brought to bear to overcome their resistance on certain issues.)

Secondly, through *reverse targeting*, the opposition of a major country, say Nigeria, on a specific issue could be overcome by gathering support among its neighbors, targeting those countries that most

easily can be brought on board first. If 'everyone else is doing it' the momentum gathered may be effective in ultimately garnering the support from the initially reluctant major state.

4.5 Action Channels

An 'action channel' is the process through which the DPKO can influence key member state governments or regional/sub-regional organizations (the targets) in order to achieve the goals of enhancing effectiveness and legitimacy. Such an action channel can be either the Working Group (described below), through which the DPKO can influence target governments almost directly, or the action channel can be part of a wider sequence that ultimately leads to influencing the target (i.e. high-level UN meetings—another action channel described below—could create visibility through the media, which could influence public opinion in the target state, which again ultimately could influence the target government). The action channels that we have chosen help to further the strategic objectives mentioned earlier (i.e. visibility, legitimacy, coordination, etc.) and also seem to be feasible channels for DPKO action. Below we examine each action channel in turn, in order of their potential for contributing to furthering the DPKO's strategic objectives. These action channels are:

- Plenary sessions and working group meetings
- High-level meetings
- Academic conferences
- Internet resources
- Coordination with other UN departments and agencies

Plenary Sessions and Working Group Meetings

- *Strategic objectives addressed:* Legitimacy, coordination, African ownership, links to the UN (if regional and sub-regional organizations are invited), appropriate training, trigger mechanisms, authorization and communication.
- *Feasibility:* Very high since these meetings are already ongoing.

The 'African Peacekeeping Support Group' of representatives of countries interested in taking part in initiatives for enhancing African capacities for peacekeeping, either as donors or recipients, has so far met three times. At the last meeting, in January 1999 it was agreed that a working group should be established, composed of interested states, in order to work out concrete proposals for later discussion by the plenary. The first meeting of the working group is scheduled to take place in June 1999, possibly in Addis Abbeba, Ethiopia.

The plenary sessions and working groups are an ideal action channel for furthering the strategic objectives mentioned earlier. The meetings bring together interested member states on a regular basis and provide a forum for meaningful discussion and decision making. Including member states in the process of developing and coordinating initiatives will further the strategic objective of 'African ownership' of the results and increase the likelihood of more active and meaningful African participation in the initiatives. The remaining strategic objectives, which are of a more substantive nature, can usefully be addressed within the plenary and working groups and should be placed high on the agenda. Below, we will use negotiation theory to examine how the DPKO can best achieve the strategic objectives by using the plenary sessions and working groups as channels for DPKO action. First, we will describe the nature of the DPKO role. Second, we will look specifically at how the DPKO can influence the *structure* of negotiations. Third, we will examine how the DPKO can influence the *process* of negotiations. Finally, concrete recommendations will be given on how the DPKO can 'play its role' optimally in order to reach its strategic objectives.

The nature of the DPKO's role: The DPKO as facilitator

The DPKO's role can be likened to that of a facilitator in a multi-party, multi-issue negotiation. Facilitation can be defined as *a process in which a person who is acceptable to all members of a group, substantively neutral, and with no decision-making authority intervenes to help a group improve the way it identifies and solves problems and makes decisions, in order to increase the group's effectiveness.* Specifically, the DPKO helps facilitate the coordination among several member states on a host of issues related to enhancing Africa's capacity for peacekeeping.

Why do we speak of a 'negotiation'? A negotiation can be seen as an interchange between different parties, each willing to participate because they feel they have something to gain from negotiating. African countries clearly have something to gain from participating in training both for humanitarian reasons and because it may help make their militaries more efficient. Donor countries have an interest in peace and security in Africa both for humanitarian, economic and for some countries geo-strategic reasons. One of the goals of the DPKO is to match interests and resources in order to find joint gains to the benefit of all parties concerned.

Influencing the structure of negotiations

- **Frequency of meetings:** Frequent meetings could help increase momentum by increasing the feeling of importance of the issue of enhancing African capacities for peacekeeping. It could also strengthen the personal relationships among participants, which again could increase the level of trust and openness during negotiations. On the other hand, the DPKO does not want to increase the frequency of meetings to the point where the quality of the meetings are undermined or where the time needed to prepare for meetings undermines other important work that the DPKO could undertake instead.

- **Composition and participation:** The dilemma here is between making participation in the meetings and working groups so broad as to be ineffective or making them so exclusionary as to create mistrust among non-participants. The DPKO should keep the plenary open to all interested participants to foster openness and trust, but keep the membership of the working groups and potential sub-working groups limited in number to maintain effectiveness. Member state representatives should themselves vote for working group delegates, preferably using the principle of who 'brings the most to the table.'
- **Agenda setting:** The main task of the DPKO here is to find the right balance between making the agenda firm enough to get the process going and at the same time making the agenda loose enough to allow for creativity and input from participants. The DPKO may quickly encounter resistance if participants feel that the DPKO is taking too much control over the negotiation process, thus excessively compromising member states' sense of ownership. The DPKO should set the agenda firm enough to get the process going, but not so firm as to take away the sense of member state ownership.

Another issue relating to agenda setting is whether to negotiate the most difficult issues at the beginning or at the end of the process. Negotiating them at the end avoids deadlock during negotiations but may result in those issues never getting addressed. On the other hand, negotiating the most difficult problems at the beginning ensures that they will be given high priority but deadlock could easily result. A solution may be to start with the difficult issues, but then get into easier issues as soon as deadlock seems imminent. The experience and momentum of success while negotiating the easier issues may then help solve the tougher issues at the end.

- **Packaging the issues:** Generally, the DPKO should strive to have member states negotiate in 'packages' rather than issue by issue. The problem of negotiating issue by issue is that the issues are often inter-linked. Thus, what could seem unacceptable for one member state when negotiating a single issue alone could well be quite acceptable if included in a wider package. For instance,

African states would likely reject any talk of attaching the condition that Western aid will only go to 'democratic countries' if that issue were discussed separately. However, they may well agree to attach such a condition if donors in turn agree to double their aid efforts or if the OAU were tasked with determining what constitutes a "democratic nation".

Although the DPKO should generally let member states take ownership of the process, it may, in case of deadlock, want to draft a "single negotiating text" based on its understanding of the interests and concerns of the parties. Such a draft can help parties get away from extreme positions and come closer to approaching each other. Should there still be issues that the parties cannot agree on, however, these could be referred to in the single negotiating text as 'to be determined', with the parties at least agreeing on *how* such issues should be determined.

Influencing the process of negotiations

- **Encourage the parties to 'expand the pie' or create win-win situations:** There is ample opportunity for this because the parties come to the table with many common interests (such as peace, stability, and development in Africa). There is also ample room for 'trading.' Thus, for instance African countries may attach high value to gaining some influence over the nature of initiatives, while donor countries are generally reluctant to relinquish control to African countries. The 'creative solution' here may be to have more coordination and decision making occur through the DPKO where Africans can gain influence without donor states having to cede this influence to the African states directly.

Win-win situations can also be achieved for instance by exploiting the difference in value attached to certain outcomes. Thus, if donor countries are highly interested in securing human rights training for African troops, which could easily be provided and even paid for by the Africans, and if African countries are interested in acquiring Western military peacekeeping expertise, which is relatively cheap to deliver for donors, then there is basis for a deal. Similarly, deals can be crafted by

compensation on wholly unrelated issues such as foreign aid or openness to trade, although the participants at the DPKO's meetings may have little influence to make promises on such issues. This is by the way an argument for more high-level meetings as recommended below.

- **Encourage parties to focus on interests, not positions:** Parties often lock themselves into positions (e.g. 'we will never accept any conditions attached to military peacekeeping aid') instead of focusing on interests (e.g. 'our interests are to train our militaries for peacekeeping and to take part in the decision making process'). The DPKO should continuously keep this in mind, encouraging member states to focus on their interests and wait with any type of positioning until the very end, when the countries can realize what they may actually *gain* by presenting less extreme positions.
- **Help participants find objective criteria or principles of fairness** – this is especially useful in cases where the 'pie' has to be divided rather than shared. This avoids positional bargaining between member states. For instance, the DPKO could make an argument that whatever percentage of their defense budgets the Western countries currently spend on peacekeeping on average, African countries should spend at least a similar percentage. Although few criteria are truly 'objective' or objectively 'fair', the DPKO should nevertheless make an effort to get as close as possible in this respect.
- **Encourage a feeling of member state ownership of the process.** Involving all key member states extensively in the process to create a feeling of ownership is extremely important both to create agreements and to make them stick. Ensuring African ownership is also one of our strategic objectives. Thus, during the process, the DPKO can, if it senses that for instance Nigeria is being left out of a specific process, encourage the other member states to include Nigeria, while also encouraging Nigeria to more actively seek involvement on its own.

More parties will generally be included in the 'deals' of multi-party, multi-issue negotiations if negotiations occur face-to-face and with strong interpersonal interaction between all parties rather

than if they are left to occur bilaterally. Thus, in order to ensure more participant ownership of the process, our previous recommendation of increasing the frequency of meetings should be coupled with insuring plenty of personal interaction. (For instance by making breaks in the meetings, where participants can chat informally.)

- **Dilemma exists between specificity or vagueness of the guiding principles of the working group.** The advantage of concrete principles is that it might make it easier to sell the idea of enhancing African capacities for peacekeeping to donors and participants that currently are not involved in a major way – they would then know exactly what to expect by participating. It is possible that many potential donors would be more than willing to donate resources if only a more specific strategy existed. On the other hand, a more vague strategy might ensure broader buy-in since it would be less likely to go against specific concerns of individual member states.

Final recommendations for the DPKO

The following two final recommendations will further ensure that our strategic objectives are achieved:

- **Invite members of the main sub-regional organizations** to participate in the plenary and potentially in the working groups - initially as observers, perhaps. This would help reach the strategic objective of ensuring legitimate trigger mechanisms, authorization and strengthening regional and sub-regional organizations
- **Make sure all the strategic objectives mentioned earlier are discussed and decided on**, both in the plenary and in the working groups.

High-level Meetings

- *Strategic objectives addressed:* Visibility will be increased. All other strategic objectives could be discussed and high-level agreements could be made to further these strategic objectives.

- **Feasibility:** The UN and several Western countries have placed African security problems high on their agenda, making this a good time to push for high-level meetings.

The DPKO should organize further high-level meetings (such as UN Summits or Ministerial Level meeting), involving critical decision-makers, with the goal of increasing the strategic objective of visibility of African security issues, and to solidifying commitments from member states

Ideally, such meetings will result in public commitments of support for initiatives in Africa, fruitful discussion of obstacles, and agreement on fair and just criteria for burden sharing by member states. Also, high-level decision-makers will in fact have the authority to conclude agreements that substantially will move things forward.

- **Press statement:** At the end of the meetings, there should be a major joint press statement that demonstrates the political will and commitment of high-level officers to enhance peace and security in Africa. Particularly, the statements should include their acknowledgement of the fact that African states are often willing troop contributors in UN peacekeeping missions around the world and that they deserve international esteem and support with regard to material and financial contributions.
- **Media strategy:** It is critical to employ a more aggressive media strategy. DPKO should encourage as much media coverage as possible. Such coverage makes the issue more salient for decision-makers. It may also help inform the public about issues of African security. Such public awareness is essential, as most donor-governments' shortage of "political will" derives ultimately from the current lack of public support for devoting resources to African security.

Academic Conferences

- *Strategic objectives addressed:* Visibility will likely be low, but all other strategic objectives could be discussed, and, if practitioners are invited, also acted upon.
- *Feasibility:* DPKO may have limited resources to put into the organization of such conferences, but may be willing to lend assistance (e.g. material and personnel) to conferences organized by other groups. Academics will likely be very interested in communicating their ideas directly to practitioners and practitioners will likely be interested in hearing the views of the academic community.

DPKO should target peacekeeping experts among academia and practitioners (UN desk officers, field officers, diplomats from member states and other peacekeeping experts) and facilitate the process of information exchange and consultations through conferences. It is critical to continue public debate and academic discussions concerning the basic principles and approaches to issues such as trigger mechanisms and authorization. This is particularly useful as the international debate on peace-building and conflict prevention/resolution is still relatively young, and many practical and conceptual questions remain insufficiently explored. Through these mutual consultations, DPKO can benefit directly from the conference participants' expertise on the issues, particularly trigger mechanism and authorization. Also, the DPKO can increase the strategic objective of visibility of the issue (although it will likely be confined to the academic community) by utilizing their public profile and public agenda-setting capacity.

- **Conferences:** DPKO should organize, sponsor or co-sponsor conferences (or, more likely, encourage other institutions or organizations to sponsor them) where scholars and practitioners can exchange information and build working relationships. DPKO should also play an agenda setting role at these conferences, perhaps examining issues such as Chapter VI and VII activities, trigger mechanism and authorization. They will enable scholars to incorporate inputs from practitioners into their research,

ideally leading to useful frameworks for conceptualizing and improving peacekeeping activities. The conferences will enable practitioners (from both inside and outside of the DPKO) to gain from the insights of an outside perspective on their work.

- **Documenting the conferences:** To retain the useful contents of the discussions (particularly, new data/ information/ analysis/ theories), DPKO should have good documentation of each conference (e.g. reports on meetings, handouts of presentations and contact information) and make them available to member states and public. DPKO should also encourage conference organizers to publish a written report or synopsis upon completion of the conference.

Internet Resources

- *Strategic objectives addressed:* Visibility is enhanced somewhat (although users who access the site will probably be those who are already involved in peacekeeping). Other strategic objectives addressed include mainly coordination, links to the UN and appropriate training (specific guidelines could be published on the UN web-site).
- *Feasibility:* Quite high since such a web-site already exists (although it isn't regularly updated). Also, a web-site can be maintained rather cheaply compared to the large access to the public and to practitioners that such a web-site allows. Nevertheless, this action channel currently suffers greatly from a lack of resources to keep the web-site efficient and up to date.

In order for the DPKO to fulfill its role as a "clearinghouse of information" on African peacekeeping capacity building initiatives, additional priority should be placed on updating and maintaining the DPKO web-site on current initiatives. The web-site is a potentially valuable resource for member states

(potential donors or recipients) to examine the current context of training and to seek a niche for their own participation.

- **Electronic Bulletin Board:** Information on intended or ongoing projects and other activities is vital to ensure better coordination of initiatives and to encourage complementarity of various initiatives. To facilitate the exchange of information, DPKO should reactivate web page and also consider establishing an "Electronic Bulletin Board" where relevant information can be easily posted and exchanged. A bulletin board would enable staff from member states working on the issue to exchange information quickly and to remain updated about recent developments.
- **Web-page quality:** It must be ensured that the public has maximum and easy access to reliable and objective information. The quantity and quality of information on the web have to be given serious consideration so that it can be a high quality source of information for scholars and researches, and the interested public. The web page should be updated regularly and reflect the most recent developments.
- **Gathering member state data:** To relieve pressure on DPKO staff, every effort should be made to convince member states to provide the relevant information in an easily usable format. Ensuring accurate and timely release of information is ultimately in the member states' interest.

Coordination with Other UN Departments and Agencies

- *Strategic objectives addressed:* Legitimacy, coordination, trigger mechanisms, authorization and communication.

- **Feasibility:** Bureaucratic separation (with limited areas of responsibility) may limit the potential for coordination. Nevertheless, the DPKO has easy *access* to these departments and agencies, which will help the effort.

As mentioned earlier, African crises have deep-rooted causes that require multifaceted prescriptions. They have different time horizons and involve various organizations. Recognizing the importance of coordinating these various efforts, DPKO needs a better communication channel and working relationship with other UN bodies to ensure the continuity of various policies and operational coordination.

- **Target Desk Officers:** DPKO should target UN desk officers in other UN bureaus and bodies (UNDP, DPA, UNHCR, etc.) who work on Africa and/ or peace-related issues and organize regular meetings that involve the staff from these bodies and should foster close working relationships with them.

Appendix I: Current and Planned Activities and Programs

COUNTRY	CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS
Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional Center (CAECOPAZ) for peacekeeping training Receive military personnel and send trainers 	
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two demining instructors deployed with the UN demining operation in Mozambique Blue Crane Maintains an ADF officer on standby to support DPKO training unit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Will examine requests for assistance on a case-by-case basis
Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> equipped Malawi Company for participation in UNMAR in Rwanda (1994) provided BF 60 mil to equip a battalion to reinforce ECOMOG in Liberia during the presidential elections participated in ACRI efforts sent observers to the RECAMP exercise 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> '98, continue to participate in the ACRI programs; 12 military trainers and 1 medical team for the main body training of a Ghanaian battalion; 1 C-130 plane for the exercise ACRI-MNF-HORN
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "all of the Canadian efforts continue to be coordinated with the OAU." \$2.5 mil capacity building fund for the OAU conflict resolution mechanism joint venture with the OAU, ISS, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Center of Canada funds courses offered... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> participation in a 5-year program for Co-ordination Assistance for Security and Development operated by UNDP.
Denmark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a government agreement with Zimbabwe in 1997 for Danish support to the regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa approximate cost: \$3.2 mil over a 3-year period from 1997 to 2000 it aims to increase the peacekeeping capacities and capabilities of SADC countries 	
Finland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> \$200,000 to the OAU Peace Fund yearly donation of \$100,000 to OAU/IPA Task Force 2 officers from SADC to participate in the Military Observer Course = \$30,000/year joint Nordic efforts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> considering possibility of organizing peacekeeping training for the Tanzania on a bilateral basis
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peacekeeping Training: financing the training of 1500 African military officers and NGOs and the creation of a peacekeeping training center in Cote d'Ivoire. Training center is open to all African countries and will train military officers and units up to battalion level (= contribution of \$30 mil.) Standby Equipment: since 01/98, provided Senegal with equipment necessary for a peacekeeping battalion and one field hospital. All available to the sub-regional countries for training purposes and eventually for peacekeeping operations. First used during Exercise "Guidimakha"; in addition transportation, storage, security and maintenance represents \$1.5 mil. Multinational Exercises: Exercise "Guidimakha" (02/23/98-03/01/98) co-organized by France, Senegal, Mali and Mauritania in order to test the "RECAMP" concept; the UN, OAU, and ANAD; the exercise participants included the troops from Cape Verde, Gambia, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RECAMP will be continued: the preparation of African battalions for peacekeeping operations as a part of a sub-regional brigade-level military component. Acting under a joint UN and OAU mandate and with the consent of the parties, this brigade would be tasked to stabilize a crisis by a preventive deployment and to react to an open crisis in order to participate to peace restoration, protect the population and facilitate humanitarian action. After reviewing the Guidimakha Exercise, new
France (continued)		

	Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau; the US and the UK with one infantry platoon and one aircraft each; Belgium with one aircraft; UNHCR and ICRC as observers.	initiatives will be considered.
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support-Aid Program: 4-year program. includes the provision of military advisory groups to 10 African states (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Namibia, Zambia, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia and Guinea) and training and materials for civilian police. Costs about 45.4 mil DM. Training Assistance Programs: provision of military courses in Germany at battalion/ company commander levels for UNMOC, UNSOC, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Namibia, Zimbabwe and S.A. Support of sub-regional orgs: provided materials to troop contributors to peacekeeping operations (ECOMOG, ECOWAS); financial and material supports Other projects, such as infrastructure, communication, medical facilities, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuation and expansion of current operation focused on improved coordination of all measures supporting African Peacekeeping efforts 3-year program (1999-2001) support of regional and multi-national SADC Ex Blue Crane (11/98) support SADC peacekeeping training center
Ireland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> offers specialized training at the UNTSI; regular participants include officers from Egypt, Zambia, Morocco, Tanzania, and Ethiopia 	
Italy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A contribution geared towards a peace initiative for Somalia. Trained deminers in the framework of the UNAVEM III mission in Angola. Provide a UN logistics base at Brindisi, which is the primary base used for shipment of any material to almost all ports in Africa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A new initiative with Ethiopia, in three possible area of cooperation; tactical mobility, engineering services and health services; this involves the establishment of a Ethiopian Brigade for peacekeeping activities. Financing education and training.
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> \$600,000 to the Trust Fund by the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa \$500,000(1996) and \$ 450,000(1997) to the OAU Peace Fund 	
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular courses offered Covers all expenses for 6 officers from SADC countries Norwegian military officers teaching at African institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possible joint Nordic follow-up initiatives under Nordic mission on peacekeeping and conflict prevention in Africa is under review.
Norway (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financing 5-year program " training for peace in S.A." Nordic mission on peacekeeping and conflict prevention in Africa (1997) 	
Pakistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> training nuclear staff provision of training materials on peacekeeping, i.e. Books and pamphlets, etc 	
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The school for motor vehicle mechanics and drivers at the training center in Musaka, Rwanda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A pilot project for mine clearance with the Egyptian government (= \$150,000)
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supports peace exercise "Blue Crane" by S.A. Supports the regional institute in Zimbabwe for "Blue Crane" "train the trainers" : at the SADC regional peacekeeping training center in Zimbabwe. SWEDINT conducts UN courses: SADC is invited to send 2 participants a year. \$136,000 contribution for the OAU mechanism for conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepared to seek and take part in projects which enable specific states in Africa or the region to arrange training programs as part of capacity building (train the trainers), such as Blue Crane. Contribution of SEK 3 mil over

	prevention , management and resolution.	<p>1998-2000 for "Emerging Critical African Situations," a project which aims to establish a system for monitoring and obtaining early info about developing crises and conflicts on the continent.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SIDA supports various projects by ISS, the Center for Conflict Resolution, and the Center for Policy Studies.
U.K.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Helping to develop national staff colleges as UN centers of excellence for regional peacekeeping training in Ghana and Zimbabwe. ▪ Conducting peacekeeping map exercises ▪ Assisting in the production of a peacekeeping glossary in English/ French ▪ Supporting sub-regional peacekeeping field exercises, such as RECAMP ▪ Providing short-term training for African battalions about to deploy to UN peacekeeping operations ▪ Contributing to the UN Trust Fund 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Help to organize command pose exercise for OAU's conflict management division ▪ Fund the continuation of ACRI training ▪ Plan to establish an advisory training team in Kampala, Angola ▪ Peacekeeping courses/ modules/ skill sessions in Swiss/ Malawi/ Mauritius/ Mozambique
US	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) will be continued.

Appendix II a: Analysis of Relevant peacekeeping actors

1. UNITED NATIONS

- 1) **Capacity:** The United Nations has significant capacity for conducting consensual peacekeeping operations. It has a large support structure, access to equipment and personnel, standard operating procedures, and a tremendous amount of experience dealing with peacekeeping operations. It is probably the most capable organization for conducting peacekeeping operations and implementing comprehensive agreements, especially because of its experience coordinating with other agencies and NGOs to address structural problems. Its mixed results (e.g. failed Angola and promising Mozambique) attest to the many challenges of securing peace in Africa.

Recently, however, it being called increasingly to respond to intrastate instability and conflict. The UN has less experience here, and its mandates sometimes prove limiting (as in UNIMIR's impotency in the face of growing violence in Rwanda). Although the UN Standby Arrangements have helped increase quick access to troops and equipment of significant capability, the UN does *not* have the capacity to launch and coordinate sustained combat operations. True peace-enforcement operations, then, must usually be "contracted" out.

- 2) **Legitimacy:** Perhaps the UN's greatest asset its ability to operate with the voice and authority of the international community. This gives its forces increased respect and legitimacy. But acting as the voice of the international community stems from building consensus and means that the UN cannot move faster than its member states, as a reluctant Security Council has shown time and again.
- 3) **Political will:** With the end of the Cold War came new hope that the international community would play a more active and effective role in maintaining international peace and security. The UN authorized several peacekeeping missions, and most were of a more ambitious nature: of the 21 operations between 1988 and 1994, thirteen were largely devoted to peacekeeping *within* particular countries.

Enthusiasm for forceful intervention, however, quickly waned after the perceived debacle in Somalia in 1993. The Security Council—reflecting Western concerns about the danger to troops, the cost and effectiveness of missions, and concerns about sovereignty—developed a more cautious approach. Much of the international community also disliked the high cost of the operation and the impression that the peacekeepers were fighting the local population. This new hesitancy was clear in Rwanda where, despite the legal commitment to intervene to halt genocide, the Security Council turned a blind eye. What has become increasingly clear is that the political will and resources of the international community to engage in managing conflicts in Africa has dwindled. This lack of interest on the part of the wider international community has placed added responsibility on African institutions-- the Organization of African Unity (OAU), sub-regional organizations and groups of states, individual states, and the NGOs-- to address African problems.

2. Organization of African Unity (OAU)

- 1) **Capacity:** The OAU has focused most of its time and resources on conflict prevention and diplomatic efforts at dispute resolution. Greater familiarity with disputants and issues give the OAU a particular advantage in these areas. The OAU'S quiet diplomacy in countries such as Nigeria, its political mobilization role such as in marshaling African military contributions for the UN peacekeeping operation at the height of the genocide in Rwanda, its dispatch of military observers in Burundi, and its electoral observation role in Republic of Congo, Togo, Gabon and elsewhere, makes it continually relevant in African conflict management efforts.

The OAU is much less capable, however, to carry out military interventions. This stems from lack of resources and organization, as well as the lack of structures within the OAU that could trigger and coordinate interventions. While the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in 1993 may provide the basis for such a capability in the future, the current capability is quite limited (and focused on conflict prevention and early warning). The OAU's effectiveness in interventions also suffers from the shortage of properly trained or equipped troops in Africa. Finally, the OAU's consensus-based decision making also tends to make it slow and generally ineffectual.

- 2) **Legitimacy:** Because the OAU is a consensus-based organization, any action it takes in Africa will likely be regarded as legitimate among African states. Additionally, the OAU—despite its intent to play a more active role in preventive diplomacy—has repeatedly stressed its conviction that the UN maintain its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is likely, then, that the OAU will seek to have any military actions under its coordination and authority also authorized by the UN. This will lend the operations even greater legitimacy (although seeking UN approval may slow the OAU's response time).
- 3) **Political will:** The OAU, as a consensus-based international organization with a large number of member states, has serious difficulty fostering the political will to take strong action. Member states also seem to have a particular reluctance to assume too much of the burden for peacekeeping / peace-enforcement, as they fear abandonment by the West. Many African states have also traditionally been reluctant to intervene in other states "internal" problems. With the autocratic tendencies of many African governments, some leaders fear a practice of "humanitarian" interventions could eventually pose a threat to their own regimes.

3. SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- 1) **Capacity:** Sub-regional organizations, including ECOWAS in West Africa, IGAD in the Horn of Africa, and SADC in Southern Africa, have increasingly assumed political, and in some cases, military functions with respect to their sub-regions. Informal sub-regional initiatives, such as the decision taken on 31 July 1996 in Arusha by leaders of the sub-regional states to impose economic sanctions against Burundi in response to a military coup d'etat there, or the more robust actions taken by ECOWAS states against the coup leaders in Sierra Leone in 1997, have met with some success. Their proximity to the conflicts gives them greater understanding of the local issues and complexities and also reduces the challenge of force projection. Military initiatives are generally limited by lack of resources and trained/equipped troops, as well as limited organizational capacity to trigger and coordinate action. Moreover, the military capacity within sub-regions varies greatly. ECOWAS has significant potential, although it is clearly dominated by Nigeria. SADC also has potential, but must overcome South Africa's reluctance. The other sub-regions have very limited capacity.

- 2) **Legitimacy:** While shared interests in the peace and security of the sub-region increase the likelihood of intervention, sub-region based intervention may also leave the door open for action based on questionable political or resource motives. Additionally, the relative dearth of military capability in Africa has tended to mean that sub-regional organizations and their interventions are dominated by a small number of states, notably Nigeria in ECOWAS/ECOMOG, and South Africa in SADC. The sub-region could then act as a veil for essentially unilateral interventions. Clearly, legitimacy of sub-regional interventions would be enhanced if they received authorization from the OAU and/or the UN.
- 3) **Political will:** African sub-regions have expressed a willingness to address security concerns where the UN has not. Unfortunately, a general lack of resources within sub-regions has meant that interventions tend to occur when sub-regions are directly threatened, or stand to gain from an intervention. Interventions on humanitarian grounds seem unlikely unless refugee flows or other side effects appear likely to destabilize the sub-region.

4. UNILATERAL OR AD-HOC INTERVENTIONS

- 1) **Capacity:** Several individual states have the capability to mount strong military operations, which can serve to support peace or lead to instability. The latter has been clearly demonstrated recently by multiple interventions in the Congo.
- 2) **Legitimacy:** Questions of legitimacy are intensified during unilateral action. Although states always have the right to act in self-defense, unilateral action may often stem from less benign motives, such as access to mineral resources or personal disagreements with other leaders.
- 3) **Political will:** Political will is easiest to foster unilaterally or in coalitions of like-minded states. There are no obstacles of consensus.

Appendix II b: Background information on Relevant peacekeeping actors

1. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

The OAU was founded in 1963 and counts about 50 member states. The OAU is committed to creating an Africa-wide customs union and to removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. The organization has been criticized as being just a talking shop, and has been hampered for years by severe budgetary problems. The foreign affairs ministers of member states meet twice a year to discuss the implementation of the organization's accords. The issues raised are dealt with at the annual assembly of heads of state, which meets in June or July.

The problem of conflict resolution has come to dominate the annual summit of heads of state. At the 1992 summit the OAU was criticized for never having successfully resolved a conflict in any of its member states. The possibility of the establishment of a military force to observe and monitor cease-fires negotiated by the OAU has been raised by several heads of state but no formal commitment has been made. The issue has been particularly pressing in the wake of renewed ethnic violence in Burundi in 1996, but the OAU again stopped short of agreeing to establish a military force, although it did sponsor peace talks between Burundian factions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Any move to step up the activity of the OAU is hampered by the organization's severe budgetary problems. In November 1995 the ten worst debtors, owing \$16.5m between them, were debarred from speaking or voting at any OAU meeting. The return of full rights is conditional upon their paying a large part of their arrears. By the time of the 1997 summit, although the organization's finances were in better shape than they had ever been, membership arrears still totaled \$53m. The OAU's budget for fiscal year 1997/98 was set at \$64m.

The OAU remains a high-profile talking shop. Little real action results from its policy decisions, constrained as it is by limited funds and the varying levels of commitment of its members.

2. SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1977. There are currently fourteen (14) countries participating in SADC and Kenya is an observer country. These 14 countries comprise the following : Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its secretariat is located in Gaborone, Botswana. Its main goals are: boosting southern Africa's general economic independence, building regional integration and trade and mobilizing support for national and regional projects.

A total of 90% of SADC's funding for sectoral projects is from foreign sources. International support for the community should continue to be solid, although donors warned in early 1995 that members should not expect to rely on continual handouts. At present SADC members contribute equally to the annual budget of \$12.5m.

In the past few years, Southern Africa Development Community has achieved a lot in terms of regional security coordination and cooperation. As an organization, it has also managed to resolve and manage conflicts in two of the member states. It has conducted a multi national field training exercise that

attracted almost all the member states. Its Regional Peace Keeping Training Centre is in Harare, Zimbabwe.

In the long run the organization is likely to include two more members, Madagascar and the Comoros. Given adequate funding, the region is ready now to under take more multi-national force training, and even putting up a sub-regional multi-national force to be employed in either peace keeping or peace enforcement operations. As a medium term objective, the region could be encouraged to start putting together and training a stand by force of about battalion strength. The long-term object could be to train a more cohesive force along lines similar to the NATO concept. In the way of training, a firm foundation has already been laid. Some countries in the region have either sponsored, cosponsored or coordinated seminars in peacekeeping training. The structures that are already in place may only need strengthening.

3. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS was established in 1975 by 15 West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde joined in 1977. The principal objective of the community, to be achieved in stages, is the establishment of a customs union and a common market in order to promote the free movement of goods and people within West Africa. ECOWAS has a small executive secretariat based in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, and seven specialized commissions. Decision-making powers are divided between Council of Ministers, while supreme authority rests with the annual conference of heads of state and government, who elect a chairman.

Progress towards improved regional economic co-operation and integration has been limited, however, with ECOWAS focusing increasingly on political and security issues in the 1990s. While a number of tariffs have been abolished or reduced under the aegis of ECOWAS, in 1994 francophone members set up their own Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA) to work towards a customs union and other aspects of economic convergence. UEMOA members-Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo-already share the same currency, the CFA franc and similar legal codes. This move reflected the fundamental tension between the largest and most powerful country in the region, Nigeria, and much of francophone West Africa.

On regional security issues, ECOWAS has been far more active. As part of efforts to enforce an agreement ending the civil war in Liberia in 1990, the organization established the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In a theory, ECOMOG was to be a multinational peacekeeping force. However, in practice it was quickly dominated by Nigerian army units, and became an instrument for the implementation of Nigeria's regional foreign policy, first opposing Charles Taylor's rebel force, only to switch sides in 1994 after a change of government in Abuja. This process further revealed the cleavage that exists between Nigeria and a number of francophone states.

Anxious to present itself as a regional policeman to western powers reluctant to become involved in messy, West African conflicts, Nigeria stepped up the profile of ECOMOG, deploying not only in Liberia, but also in Sierra Leone. In 1997 a Nigerian force operating under an ECOMOG banner intervened decisively in Sierra Leone to topple a military-led junta and restore the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Although the capital, Freetown, was quickly taken, fighting has continued in rural areas.

The sudden death of Nigeria's authoritarian military ruler, General Sani Abacha, in June 1998, opened the way for a new shift in regional politics. His replacement, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, has been anxious to lower Nigeria's profile in the region and to dilute its domination of ECOWAS. At the Abuja

summit in October 1998 he relinquished the ECOWAS chair, held by Nigeria since 1995, which now passes to one of the more conservative francophone leaders, General Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. At the meeting it was agreed that he would hand over to Mali's president, Alpha Oumar Konare, in 2000.

In an indication of Nigeria's new enthusiasm for a more collaborative approach to regional security issues, commitments were secured from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger to send troops to join ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone. A similarly broad-based ECOMOG mission will also enforce a November 1998 peace agreement ending nearly six months of civil war in Guinea-Bissau. The Abuja summit also agreed to establish a new, permanent, peacekeeping structure in the region, creating an entirely new peacekeeping department in the ECOWAS secretariat and providing a new command structure for a regional intervention force. The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security hopes to prevent crises from exploding into violence, and to halt fighting quickly if it begins, with the use of armed force as a means of last resort.

The apparent harmony at the summit nevertheless masked continuing differences between Nigeria and the largest francophone economy, Cote d'Ivoire, which will continue to block moves towards regional integration, the scope for which is in any case limited by the competing export profiles of most commodity-based economies in ECOWAS.

4. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

The Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the brainchild of the president of Djibouti, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, was established in January 1986 with six East African members: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Its stated aim was to co-ordinate and channel funding into the alleviation of drought and desertification and into agricultural development. Progress on development and environmental projects was slow but the organization did make headway as a forum for regional politics, facilitating the successful reconciliation of Somalia and Ethiopia in 1988. Regional events in 1991, however, undermined IGADD: the presidents of Ethiopia and Somalia were overthrown, Eritrea gained independence and the self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic emerged.

Although IGADD was strengthened when Eritrea became the seventh member in September 1993, it achieved little success in helping to resolve internal conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. Thus in March 1996, at a summit in Nairobi, IGADD renamed itself the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and adopted a new charter proclaiming conflict resolution to be its priority. IGAD gained official recognition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a regional economic organization in June 1997, and it began to pay more attention to economic integration. However, the resolution of conflicts, both regional and domestic, continues to be seen as a precondition for economic integration, but IGAD's failure to play a part in resolving the conflict among its own members has undermined its regional influence. Nevertheless, developments since 1996 are expected to help IGAD to secure donor aid for long-term development projects.

5. TRIPARTITE COMMISSION FOR EAST AFRICAN CO-OPERATION (EAC)

Established in May 1996, the Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation (EAC) is the successor to the now defunct East African Community. Its three members are Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Unlike the old East African Community, attempted to impose supranational control over all areas of government, the new focuses on the harmonization of policies. Specifically, when the EAC was formed, the dismantling of borders for the free movement of people, a common travel document and a joint secretariat for railways were envisaged. Other measures to be tackled included the harmonization of

fiscal and monetary policies, and policies on traffic, the environment and security. When progress has been made in some of these areas, the EAC will begin to look at developing a regional economic infrastructure and promoting trade and investment. Significantly, the EAC was not designed to create a common currency and monetary union in the first instance, but to provide a strong alternative to other regional trading organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Franc Zone.

In April 1998 a new treaty set out the steps to political federation, based on the report from a meeting held in November 1997. The treaty establishing the EAC has shortcomings which can only be corrected by this new treaty. It will confer on the EAC recognition as a legal entity acting in the common interest of member states. Discussions on broadening the membership base, perhaps to include Rwanda, Burundi and, although less likely, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), will also continue, as will discussions among leaders about the relationship of the EAC with the existing but moribund Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) and the thriving SADC.

A budget has been approved for the Regional Defence Affairs unit, which is expected to begin at the EAC Secretariat in Arusha on 1 November 1998. Other approved projects include the harmonization of military training syllabi as well as the integration of military schools, military research and production facilities.

Appendix III a: Analysis of the Most Important African Countries

1. WEST AFRICA

Nigeria hugely dominates West Africa. Its GDP, army and population are more than three times that of its closest contender, Cote d'Ivoire. Nigeria also has a strong tradition of peacekeeping involvement, as recently in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The recent election of a civilian president has strengthened relations with the West as well as the legitimacy of its government. Finally, Nigeria has actively sought to persuade other countries in the region to contribute troops to peacekeeping. The main problems with Nigeria, in terms strengthening its peacekeeping capacities, is that it maintains a border dispute with Cameroon and also that it with its new civilian President seems less interested in playing the role of regional peacekeeper in the future.

Cote d'Ivoire seems to be the second largest power in the region and is regarded as France's main ally in Africa. It is peaceful with a tradition of an apolitical military and relations with Ghana and Nigeria have been improving. Cote d'Ivoire has no serious territorial or other military disputes with anyone. Nevertheless, Cote d'Ivoire is traditionally suspicious of Nigeria and of other anglophone countries in the region, which is perhaps why it did not contribute to the peacekeeping force in Liberia. Also, Cote d'Ivoire's army is relatively small.

Ghana is also politically stable with no territorial disputes. It has maintained a prominent peacekeeping role in Liberia and also is said to have strong regional foreign policy ambitions. Nevertheless, Ghana is only half as wealthy as Cote d'Ivoire both in total GDP and GDP per capita terms.

Senegal seems to be on a par with Cote d'Ivoire in terms of military strength, despite its much smaller population. It as strong French backing (including 1,300 permanent French soldiers) and has a long tradition and interest in peacekeeping. Nevertheless, Senegal's economy is only half that of Cote d'Ivoire, and it is fighting a violent rebellion in the South, for which reason it was asked to leave the peacekeeping force in neighboring Guinea-Bissau.

	Capacity	Legitimacy	Political will
Nigeria	High	Medium/High	High but uncertain
Cote d'Ivoire	Medium	High	Low
Ghana	Medium?	High	Medium/High
Senegal	Medium	Medium	High

The main **sub-regional organization** is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), described in Appendix II, includes 16 West African countries. ECOWAS has recently decided to provide a new command structure for a regional intervention force and generally seems to be becoming even more active in peacekeeping. However, the scope for continued integration is blocked by differences between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire.

2. SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa seems to be even more dominant in its region than Nigeria in West Africa, with a total GDP of more than nine times that of its closest contender (and political rival), Zimbabwe. It maintains a large and capable military and has no external challenges. South Africa also has an interest in repairing its tarnished image from the Lesotho intervention. Finally it has played a strong mediating role in Congo and Angola. Nevertheless, South Africa has been reluctant to contribute to regional peacekeeping/peace enforcement and has had difficulty establishing itself as a credible and consistent force in regional politics. Its strong economic interests in the region have raised suspicions as to its interests, for instance undermining its efforts in Congo.

Zimbabwe has strong regional ambitions, and although much weaker economically than South Africa, it has a sizable military force (39,000 troops as against South Africa's 79,000). Zimbabwe has a strong interest in SADC as a vehicle for legitimizing its intervention in the DRC. However, internal opposition to the President is mounting because of his expensive involvement in the DRC. In addition, the motives for going into the DRC seem suspect: Is it to gain mineral contracts, to make people forget about the internal problems, or is it because the DRC's President Kabila is an old friend of Zimbabwean President Mugabe?

Botswana is the richest country in the region per capita and seems to have taken a more proactive regional policy by committing troops to Lesotho. Its military spending and capability are fairly high and Botswana is also rather stable politically. Finally, its commitment to the SADC is fairly high, given that SADC headquarters is located in Botswana's capital. However, while Botswana's population is only 1.6 million, its commitment to developing a Southern African peacekeeping force is uncertain.

Zambia has gained respect throughout Africa for supplying troops to difficult missions and it has also taken a lead in diplomatic efforts towards peace in the DRC. It is stable politically, but it poor and has a relatively small army. Further, its relations with Angola are severely strained.

Malawi has friendly relations with its neighbors and it has carefully avoided involvement in the war in the DRC. However, it is very small and poor and has a very small military capacity.

	Capacity	Legitimacy	Political will
South Africa	High	Medium/High	Medium
Zimbabwe	Medium/High	Medium/Low	High
Botswana	Medium	High	Medium/High
Zambia	Low	Medium	High
Malawi	Low	High	Medium

The main **sub-regional organization** is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), described in Appendix II, which counts 17 members, including the countries above. In the past few years, SADC has achieved a lot in terms of regional security coordination and cooperation. As an organization, it has also managed to resolve and manage conflicts in two of its member states. It has conducted a multi national field training exercise that attracted almost all the member states. Thus, SADC has a lot of actual capacity and future potential, although differences between South Africa and Zimbabwe seem to undermine it somewhat.

3. EASTERN AND NORTH-EASTERN AFRICA

Egypt has a total GDP close to that of South Africa, with a GDP per capita well above most African countries. In addition, it seems to have the largest military force in Africa, beefed up by \$1.3 billion in annual military aid from the United States. Egypt also has vital interests in the Nile countries, especially Sudan and Ethiopia. Egypt is very stable politically despite sporadic Islamist violence, and Egypt also has strong peacekeeping experience. However, Egypt's main focus is on the Middle East and many African countries do not see Egypt as really being 'African'. At the recent DPKO Plenary meeting regarding enhancing African capacities for peacekeeping, Egypt voiced the strongest opposition of all African countries towards the current initiatives.

Kenya has been positioning itself as an island of stability amid the turmoil that surrounds it. The political and military tensions with Uganda and Tanzania have been diminishing, and all three participated in an US-assisted joint military training exercise in 1998. Kenya generally maintains political stability, despite sporadic violence in the north of the country. Nevertheless, Kenyan President Moi has opted to keep a low international profile.

Ethiopia has a large and well-equipped military, has warm relations with the Sudanese government and has worked to secure peace in Somalia through the OAU, which it houses. Ethiopia has been an active participant in UN peacekeeping missions. However, it has for some time been at war with Eritrea, undermining its legitimacy and political will, and it is a relatively poor country.

Uganda has strong regional security interests and has a relatively strong military, but its involvement on the side of the rebels in the DRC has undermined its regional legitimacy. In addition, Uganda has internal security problems, including rebel attacks linked to the war in the DRC.

	Capacity	Legitimacy	Political will
Egypt	High	Medium/Low	Low
Kenya	Medium	Medium/High	Low
Ethiopia	High	Low	Low
Uganda	Medium	Low	Low

The main **sub-regional organizations** in the region are the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD); both described in Appendix II. The EAC comprises Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, while IGAD comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. Both concern themselves somewhat with security affairs, although both organizations are still quite weak in that respect.

Appendix III b: Basic Facts of the Most Important African Countries

The following tables are ordered first by region (West Africa, Southern Africa, North-Eastern Africa) and then by total GDP. The information contained in the tables is from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Quarterly Reports (4th quarter 1998 or 1st quarter 1999 if available) and EIU Country Reports (1998-1999 or 1999-2000 if available). GDP is measured at market prices. The category 'total regular armed forces' includes an 'others' category, besides army, navy and air force. 'IDA' is the International Development Association. 'ADF' is the African Development Fund.

1. WEST AFRICA

Nigeria

Variables	Facts					
Population(1997)	105 million					
GDP (1997)	\$37 billion					
GDP/capita	\$352					
Military forces (1998)	Army	62,000				
	Air force	9,500				
	Navy	5,500				
	Total regular armed forces					77,000
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	Exports to:	%	Imports from:	%		
	US	37.0	US	13.2		
	Spain	8.6	Germany	11.8		
	India	8.4	UK	11.4		
	Germany	4.8	France	7.4		
	France	4.0	Netherlands	5.3		
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral	47.3	Multilateral	144.5	Total	191.8
	of which:		of which:		of which:	
	Germany	14.5	IDA	89.2	grants	108.9
	UK	11.5	UNDP	25.0		
	France	6.1	UNDP	25.0		
	Japan	-2.0	Unicef	14.5		
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	<p>The new military administration appears ready to fulfil its pledge to restore civilian government in May 1999 but increasing ethnic rivalry and mounting economic problems may test its liberalism. With the new registered parties led by veteran politicians, the struggle for power in the Fourth Republic promises to be keenly fought.</p> <p>The question is less whether an elected president will actually be sworn in May, than over the durability of the incoming civilian republic in a nation ruled by generals for all but ten of its 38 years of independence. The outcome of the latest move to constitutional rule will depend on the extent to which the underlying factors that have caused instability are tackled during the coming months. Nigeria's medium- to long-term outlook therefore remains clouded by deep- seated problems stemming from a highly politicized military, institutionalized corruption, ethnic and economic mismanagement.</p>					
Foreign policy	<p>The easing of domestic tensions has allowed General Abubakar to pursue with some success efforts to normalize relations with Nigeria's traditional trading partners in North America and Europe, after five difficult years under Abacha. Western governments have already relaxed most of the mild international sanctions imposed in response to human rights abuses and the slow pace of democratization, but a full restoration of diplomatic ties is most unlikely before the presidential election next February, and will probably wait until the formal hand-over to an elected government in May.</p> <p>Since leading West African peacekeeping troops into Liberia in 1990, Nigeria has played the role of the regional policeman, intervening also in Sierra Leone influencing the</p>					

	<p>outcome of coups in Niger and The Gambia. However, the foreign policy of an incoming civilian administration may be less adventurous, with a new government looking to save money on costly adventures abroad and concentrate on the domestic agenda. Radical moves to slash defense spending and scale down operations within the region might prove counter-productive, however, as they would fuel resentment and hostility within the armed forces.</p> <p>Nigerian forces remain entangled in Sierra Leone where they head ECOMOG, the West African peacekeeping force fighting rebels trying to topple President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who was restored to power in March by the regional force. General Abubakar, as current chairman of the 16-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has tried without success to persuade member countries to send more troops to Sierra Leone to consolidate peace enforcement and dilute Nigeria's domination of ECOMOG.</p> <p>Relations between Nigeria and Cameroon remained tense as both countries accused the other of massing troops in the disputed oil-rich Bakassi peninsula.</p>
--	--

Cote d'Ivoire

Variables	Facts			
Population (1997)	14 million			
GDP (1997)	\$11 billion			
GDP/capita	\$743			
Military forces (1997)	Army	6,800		
	Navy	900		
	Air force	700		
	Presidential guard	1,100	Gendarmerie	4,400
	Total regular armed forces	13,900	Reserves	12,000
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	Exports to:	%	Imports from:	%
	Netherlands	16.6	France	28.5
	France	15.3	Nigeria	19.6
	Germany	7.2	US	5.5
	US	6.2	Italy	4.6
	Italy	5.3	Germany	3.9
Official Development Assistance (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral	449.2	Multilateral	518.4
	of which:		of which:	
	France	300.3	IDA	234.8
	Germany	34.0	IMF	138.4
	Japan	58.1	EU	104.1
	US	14.0		
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	<p>With a cabinet reshuffle in August, the government has begun preparing for the legislative and presidential elections due in 2000. In order to prevent a confrontation at the ballot box, it will seek to undermine the opposition, co-opting more opposition leaders into the government in an attempt to weaken Alassane Dramane Ouattara, President Henri Konan Bedie's opponent. Government propaganda will focus on continued economic growth and the promise of more social spending.</p> <p>Cote d'Ivoire's army is small and has remained largely apolitical since independence. Strains have appeared, however, and Mr. Konan Bedie, himself not a military man, is suspicious of the army and its leadership, worrying about subversion in the ranks and over-mighty generals.</p>			
Foreign policy	<p>France remains Cote d'Ivoire's most significant political, economic and military ally. For France, Cote d'Ivoire is its most important African foothold, and a favored partner in the global francophone community. At the same time, the government has been working hard to develop new international relationships, linked to the rapidly developing energy, mining and communications sectors, and is seeking improved partnerships with the US, Canada, South Africa, western Europe and the Far East,</p>			

	<p>including China.</p> <p>While it has generally dominated the sub-region's francophone organizations, Cote d'Ivoire has tended to remain distant from its anglophone neighbors and has often been preoccupied with Nigeria's sub-regional intentions. However, relations with Nigeria, and Ghana in particular, have grown warmer under Mr Konan Bedie. Cote d'Ivoire has used ECOWAS, the near-dormant Conseil de l'entente and the Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'ouest to maintain its influence in West Africa. As many as 350,000 refugees from neighbouring Liberia were billeted in camps inside Ivorian territory at the height of the Liberian civil war, but the government was determined to keep out of any involvement in the conflict, and declined to commit troops to the Nigerian- led ECOWAS Monitoring Group.</p>
--	---

Ghana

Variables	Facts
Population (1997)	18 million
GDP (1997)	\$6.1 billion
GDP/capita	\$343
Military forces (1998)	?
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	Exports to: % Imports from: % Togo 13 UK 15 UK 12 Nigeria 14 Germany 10 US 10 US 9 Germany 6 France 7 Spain 5
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral 348.9 Multilateral 307.1 Total incl others 653.6 of which: of which: of which: Japan 110.0 IDA 233.7 grants 315.3 US 30.0 EU 73.7 Germany 37.1 IMF -61.0 UK 33.6 Arab countries -2.4
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	The ruling National Defense Council (NDC) will have problems maintaining party unity following the recent emergence of a new faction, the Reform Group. Vice-president Atta Mills must rally political allies if he is to secure the party leadership in 2000. President Rawlings will focus his attention on regional issues, while donor relations will continue to improve, despite increased domestic pressure to slow economic reforms. Government relations with students and the press remain tense.
Foreign policy	With Nigeria, now under the leadership of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, again courting international favor, ECOWAS is poised to reassert itself under Nigerian leadership. It is perhaps in this context that Mr. Rawlings will remain keen on strengthening relations with Ghana's powerful neighbor and projecting himself and Ghana through ECOWAS as important players in regional relations. Pursuing his active regional foreign policy, President Rawlings hosted the presidents of Burkina Faso in August and Equatorial Guinea in September. Since the mid- 1990s the Rawlings government has had a working, if not warm, relationship with Cote d'Ivoire and Togo. Ghana maintained a prominent peacekeeping role in Liberia.

Senegal

Variables	Facts			
Population (1997)	8.8 million			
GDP (1997)	\$4.8 billion			
GDP/capita	\$551			
Military forces (1997)	Army	12,000		
	Navy	700		
	Air force	650		
	Total	13,350		
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	Exports to:	%	Imports from:	%
	India	25.6	France	30.6
	Mali	9.4	Nigeria	7.3
	France	8.4	US	4.8
	Cote d'Ivoire	4.6	Spain	4.5
	Benin	4.1	India	3.9
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral	402.1	Multilateral	179.5
	of which:		of which:	
	France	177.6	EU	42.1
	Japan	58.0	IDA	102.9
	US	43.0	ADF	12.5
	Germany	35.8	UNDP	3.5
	Canada	16.0	Total	581.5
			of which:	
			grants	505.6
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	<p>The ruling Socialist Party (PS) will continue to exploit its hold over government to further its own political ambitions, which will enrage the opposition and batter the Senegal's image as a democracy among the international community. The president, Abou Diouf, hopes to be re-elected in 2000, but could face a stiff challenge. Stung by its defeat in neighboring Guinea-Bissau, the army will keep a watchful and embittered eye on the rebellious region of Casamance. Growing discontent in the public sector could start unsettling the government, as the benefits expected from sturdy economic growth and social investment fail to materialize.</p>			
Foreign policy	<p>Although Senegal's political leaders will continue to devote most of their attention the partisan battles fought out mainly in Dakar, they also will keep an eye on armed conflicts in Casamance and in neighboring Guinea-Bissau. The war between the army and the separatist Mouvement des forces democratiques de Casamance (MFDC), while a traumatic experience for that region, has rarely had much impact on national politics. But its sudden linkage with Guinea-Bissau's domestic strife has demonstrated the broader destabilizing influence the Casamance conflict can have.</p> <p>The Senegalese military intervention into Guinea-Bissau's civil war was aimed, in large part, against the Casamancais rebel forces allied with the opposition to the Bissau president, Joao Bernardo Vieira. As various regional peace initiatives were launched, the Senegalese government found itself politically marginalized; since it had actively sided with one party in the conflict, it had no credibility as a mediator. This was reflected in the terms of the Abuja accord, which provides for the withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops from Guinea-Bissau once a multinational force has been established under the umbrella of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Senegalese authorities have expressed some relief at the possibility of extricating themselves from a difficult situation, but at the same time appear disappointed that Senegal will not be part of the multinational West African force.</p> <p>Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN or by virtue of its membership of the ECOWAS, Senegalese troops have been particularly active regional conflict resolutions. In 1991, a contingent of 1,200 troops was sent to Liberia as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping venture. Senegal also regularly contributes to UN</p>			

	peacekeeping forces, and recently sent contingents to Rwanda and the Central African Republic. France, which maintains 1,300 soldiers permanently in Senegal, is planning to step up technical assistance to the army, by backing joint military exercises. Such an exercise, Guidimakha '98, was staged in late February 1998 and involved some 3,500 troops mostly from Mauritania, Senegal and Mali. France, the US, the UK and Belgium provided logistic support. It is hoped that a building block can be formed for a new inter-African peacekeeping force.
--	---

2. SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa

Variables	Facts				
Population (1997)	41 million				
GDP (1997)	\$86 billion				
GDP/capita	\$2098				
Military forces (1997)	Army	54,300			
	Navy	8,000			
	Air force	11,140			
	Total regular armed forces	79,440			
	Total reserves	386,000			
Main trading partners (1997)	Exports to: % of total	Imports from: % of total			
	UK 10.1	Germany	13.7		
	US 6.0	US	12.3		
	Japan 5.5	UK	11.5		
	Germany 4.4	Japan	7.4		
	Italy 3.7	Italy	4.0		
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral	311.9	Multilateral	49.2	Total 361.1
	of which:		of which:		of which:
	United States	73.0	EU	37.0	grants 353.3
	Netherlands	37.6			
	Sweden	33.2			
Outlook for 1999- 2000 & Political stability	The ANC is preparing for the 1999 election facing serious opposition in several provinces. It should win, but with a reduced majority and face several tight challenges. A general amnesty from the truth commission would have serious political fallout.				
Foreign policy	<p>There is currently little prospect of a foreign threat to South Africa's security. South Africa will be called on to clarify its muddled foreign policy -- exemplified by its botched involvement in Lesotho -- and will look to Mr. Mandela, who bows out of formal politics at the election, to serve as the country's ambassador. First on the list will be an attempt to achieve some type of compromise over the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which has pitted coalitions of African countries against each other in the civil war to oust President Laurent Kabila. South Africa has continued to espouse the benefits of the negotiated option in meetings with the rebels and their backers, Uganda and Rwanda, but will face resistance in attempts to coerce fellow Southern African Development Community (SADC) members, Angola and, especially, Zimbabwe, to agree on a non-military solution. South Africa's regional policy desperately needs a revamp, and Mr. Mbeki would like to see a successful resolution of the messy Congo conflict as one of the first successes of the new regime. Second on the list will be an attempt to repair South Africa's tarnished image in southern Africa by closing the book on the Lesotho episode and ensuring a dignified withdrawal of its discredited troops from that country.</p> <p>Both President Mandela and the deputy president, Mr. Mbeki, have been involved in attempting to encourage peace deals in Angola, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic</p>				

	of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), which have highlighted regional reticence about South Africa's intentions. In particular, SADC's role in the 1998 rebellion against President Laurent Kabila of the DRC, created open divisions among SADC members, with Zimbabwe championing the cause of intervention while South Africa favored negotiations. South Africa eventually gave grudging support for the intervention in the interests of regional unity. The September 1998 crisis in Lesotho reinforced the difficulties that South Africa faces in establishing itself as a pivotal force in regional politics.
--	--

Zimbabwe

Variables	Facts
Population(1997)	12 million
GDP (1997)	\$9 billion
GDP/capita	\$714
Military forces (1997)	Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) 35,000 Zimbabwe Air Force 4,000 Total armed forces 39,000 Police forces 21,800 Defense spending (US\$ m) 471
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	Exports to: % Imports from: % UK 11.1 South Africa 36.6 South Africa 12.1 UK 7.4 Germany 7.8 Japan 5.6 US 5.8 US 5.5 Japan 6.1 Germany 4.6
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral 280.8 Multilateral 96.1 Total 374.2 of which: of which: Japan 46.7 grants 319.9 UK 25.2 Germany 30.5 US 17.0
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	Zimbabwe's unpopular military involvement in Congo may become a watershed for the president, Robert Mugabe. Barring an unlikely withdrawal of Zimbabwe's troops from Congo, the war may well become a rallying point for anti-government sentiment, including human rights and church groups, women's associations and the unions. After the failure of the land conference in September, the land question will remain unresolved. The proposed 1999 budget presented in October, which forecasts moderate expenditure and increased revenue, may prove unrealistic, particularly as the cost of the war in Congo rises. The IMF is nevertheless likely to offer balance-of-payments support.
Foreign policy	Although Mr. Mugabe has appeared confident and assertive, he has failed to convince most of the other countries of the 14-member Southern African Development Community (SADC), and in particular South Africa, to offer military support to Mr. Kabila. Only Angola and Namibia have joined Zimbabwe in the fray. As the anti-Kabila rebels continue to make steady progress on the ground, what was initially seen as a short military adventure is increasingly becoming a substantial military exercise. At the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Durban on September 1st-4th, using his position as the chairman of the security committee of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Mr. Mugabe tried to get all 14 member countries to agree to assist the government of Congo, which was admitted to the organization in 1997. South Africa, however, refused to become embroiled in the conflict. The current chairman of SADC, the South African president, Nelson Mandela, indicated that he would determine what action the organization should take. Mr. Mugabe gained the upper hand, however, because his intervention in the Congo was supported by a majority of SADC leaders. In order to avoid a damaging split in the organization, Mr. Mandela subsequently rallied meekly behind the

	<p>intervention. Mr. Mandela has since tried to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Congo but has been rebuked on several occasions by Mr. Mugabe, who has used the conflict to bolster his position in the region. Since 1994 Mr. Mugabe has been visibly irritated by the fact that South Africa and President Mandela have overshadowed Zimbabwe in the region. His intervention in Congo has now given him the high profile he has been looking for, but the dispute has considerably strained relations between the two countries.</p> <p>Many wonder why Mr. Mugabe has become so deeply involved in the conflict in Congo. The war does not threaten Zimbabwe's security in any way and the two countries do not share a border. However, besides using the conflict to boost his regional position, Mr. Mugabe also seems to feel a special kinship with Mr. Kabila, as both support the 1960s brand of African nationalism, including socialist rhetoric, the one-party state system and the discouragement of any dissent. Further, lucrative supply contracts and mining partnerships underlie Mr. Mugabe's military support for Congo.</p>
--	--

Botswana

Variables	Facts
Population (1997)	1.6 million
GDP (1997)	\$4.9 billion
GDP/capita	\$3,250
Military forces (1997)	Army 7,000 Air force 500 Total 7,500 Police Mobile Unit 1,000 Defense budget (P m): about 10% of government expenditures
Main trading Partners (% of total, 1996)	Exports to: % of total Imports from: % of total UK 54.3 SACU 78.1 Other Europe 22.4 Zimbabwe 5.7 SACU 18.3 South Korea 4.4 Zimbabwe 3.1 Other Europe 4.1 US 1.0 UK 2.6
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1995)	Bilateral 34.7 Multilateral -1.9 Total 33.2 of which: of which: of which: Germany -1.0 EU 33.2 grants 82.3 Sweden 5.7 ADF 1.3 US 13.0 WFP 4.8 Norway 2.0 UNDP 4.1 UK 5.9 IBRD -23.1
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	The ruling BDP will almost certainly win the next legislative election, due by October 1999, as the opposition parties remain weak and disorganized. Nevertheless, President Festus Mogae and his vice-president, Ian Khama, will face growing criticism. While Botswana will have little choice but to keep troops in Lesotho well into 1999, it is relations with Namibia that will top the foreign policy agenda.
Foreign policy	Under the vice-presidency of the former army commander Mr. Khama, Botswana seems to have taken a more proactive stance as far as foreign policy is concerned, and its involvement in the Lesotho crisis appears to be an important part of a more interventionist and regional approach. Indeed, in sending troops to Lesotho (about 300, as against South Africa's 700), the Mogae administration broke with its previous policy of not participating in the talks on a joint Southern African peacekeeping force promoted by the United States. Throughout 1999 and 2000 the government is likely to concentrate on relations with Namibia, with two issues dominating the agenda. The first is the currently high-profile issue of Namibian refugees from the Caprivi Strip who have fled to Botswana because of alleged harassment by the Namibian authorities. The second, and more important, issue is that of the disputed Sedudu Island on the border between Namibia and Botswana. A judgment will be reached by the International Court of Justice in 1999 and both sides are expected to abide by

	<p>it.</p> <p>Botswana was a founding member of SADC. SADC promotes regional co-operation and trade facilitation between Southern African states and its secretariat is based in Gaborone, Botswana's capital. Despite reduced tensions in the Southern African region, Botswana's military spending remains fairly high. In the 1998/99 budget, defense expenditure was allocated 10% of total expenditure (about \$145m), ranking it as the third-largest single expenditure item. Purchases in recent years have included 13 F-5 fighter-bomber aircraft and, in 1998, 20 light tanks.</p>
--	---

Zambia

Variables	Facts
Population(1997)	10 million
GDP (1997)	\$3.7 billion
GDP/capita	\$391
Military forces (1997)	Zambia maintains smaller armed forces than its neighbors. In March 1998 the army was estimated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies to number 20,000, with another 1,600 in the air force. Paramilitary forces numbered 1,400 and comprised a 700-strong police mobile unit and a police paramilitary unit.
Main trading partners (% of total, 1996)	Exports to: Imports from: Japan 17.2 South Africa 34.0 Thailand 12.2 Saudi Arabia 12.0 Saudi Arabia 9.0 UK 9.1 India 7.0 Zimbabwe 7.5
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral 354.1 Multilateral 259.8 Total 613.9 of which: of which: of which: Japan 42.3 IDA 178.0 grants 418.4 UK 60.7 ADB 14.8 Germany 79.7 UNDP 6.7
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	The ruling MMD will face two possible political challengers, UNIP and UPND. However, UNIP's position is fragile -- its current leader, Kenneth Kaunda, is barred from standing in the 2001 national elections but he has no obvious successor. The UPND stands a better chance and should be able to unite other opposition parties in a coalition under its leadership. The politicians accused of plotting a coup in 1997 have been released.
Foreign policy	<p>Despite an ongoing war of words, relations with Angola should not deteriorate into military confrontation. Angola has accused Zambia of backing the rebel UNITA movement. President Chiluba has continued to win friends internationally, by pushing for a peaceful settlement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Zambian government cannot afford to make an enemy of its well-armed Angolan counterpart. Thus Zambia will seek to appease the Angolans; the government has already stated that an international team from the UN or the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is free to inspect the border areas.</p> <p>Regional diplomatic efforts to end the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), spearheaded by Mr. Chiluba, may be close to securing a cease-fire, though the prospects of a durable one and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Congo will remain remote. Nonetheless, Mr. Chiluba will continue to take credit for progress towards a peaceful settlement. His efforts are likely to pay off by an improvement in relations regionally, with other governments, notably South Africa and Zimbabwe, and internationally, particularly with multilateral donors.</p> <p>Diplomatic relations with South Africa have been restored since the apartheid era, but the relationship today is strained because of the MMD's conviction that the ANC biased in favor of UNIP and because of the huge trade imbalance, rendered more unpalatable by South African protectionism and dumping.</p> <p>Zambia has gained respect throughout Africa for supplying troops for difficult missions, such as UN operations in Rwanda.</p>

Malawi

Variables	Facts																																				
Population (1998)	11 million																																				
GDP (1997)	\$1.6 billion																																				
GDP/capita	\$155																																				
Military forces (1997)	Malawi's military forces numbered 5,000 active personnel and 1,000 para-military police in 1997, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This includes a small marine force of 220, which operates patrol boats on Lake Malawi, and a small air force of 80, which operates a number of helicopters, transport aircraft and Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles. Since 1981 the military has suffered major budget cuts. Military expenditure fell from 3.3% of GDP in 1981 to 1% in 1993.																																				
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	<table><tr><td>Exports to</td><td>%</td><td>Imports from</td><td>%</td></tr><tr><td>South Africa</td><td>12.8</td><td>South Africa</td><td>34.1</td></tr><tr><td>US</td><td>11.9</td><td>Zimbabwe</td><td>17.0</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>10.2</td><td>Zambia</td><td>7.5</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>9.2</td><td>UK</td><td>4.1</td></tr></table>	Exports to	%	Imports from	%	South Africa	12.8	South Africa	34.1	US	11.9	Zimbabwe	17.0	Germany	10.2	Zambia	7.5	Netherlands	9.2	UK	4.1																
Exports to	%	Imports from	%																																		
South Africa	12.8	South Africa	34.1																																		
US	11.9	Zimbabwe	17.0																																		
Germany	10.2	Zambia	7.5																																		
Netherlands	9.2	UK	4.1																																		
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	<table><tr><td>Bilateral</td><td>263.9</td><td>Multilateral</td><td>236.4</td><td>Total</td><td>500.8</td></tr><tr><td>of which:</td><td></td><td>of which:</td><td></td><td>of which:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Japan</td><td>64.0</td><td>EU</td><td>43.2</td><td>grants</td><td>293.3</td></tr><tr><td>UK</td><td>83.6</td><td>IDA</td><td>132.8</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>31.7</td><td>WFP</td><td>8.0</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>US</td><td>32.0</td><td>ADB</td><td>15.3</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>	Bilateral	263.9	Multilateral	236.4	Total	500.8	of which:		of which:		of which:		Japan	64.0	EU	43.2	grants	293.3	UK	83.6	IDA	132.8			Germany	31.7	WFP	8.0			US	32.0	ADB	15.3		
Bilateral	263.9	Multilateral	236.4	Total	500.8																																
of which:		of which:		of which:																																	
Japan	64.0	EU	43.2	grants	293.3																																
UK	83.6	IDA	132.8																																		
Germany	31.7	WFP	8.0																																		
US	32.0	ADB	15.3																																		
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	Presidential and parliamentary elections in May will dominate the political scene in 1999. President Muluzi is expected to be re-elected, but it will be more difficult for the ruling United Democratic Front (UDF) to secure a parliamentary majority. Despite the passage of a communications reform bill, the government is expected to maintain control over the media for the election period.																																				
Foreign policy	<p>The government has remained out of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), despite the efforts of Zimbabwe's president, Robert Mugabe, to get all members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to defend the government of a fellow SADC member. Instead, and following the lead of Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania, Malawi has carefully avoided any involvement in the war to defend the government of Laurent- Desire Kabila from a rebellion supported by Uganda and Rwanda.</p> <p>Malawi currently enjoys friendly relations with all of its neighbors in Southern Africa, as well as good relations with the Western powers. One potential threat to Malawi's security is the group of roughly 1,000 armed and disaffected members of the now disbanded Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), reportedly camped in the wilds of northern Mozambique from which attacks on Malawi are planned. Nevertheless, the danger posed by the MYP should not be exaggerated. It has been nearly five years since the band allegedly fled to Mozambique. With each passing year its threat to Malawi's security is reduced.</p> <p>The fact that the Malawi President is Muslim (although most of the population is not) has led to strengthened ties with Muslim countries.</p>																																				

3. NORTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA

Egypt

Variables	Facts
Population (1996)	60 million
GDP (1997)	\$76 billion
GDP/capita	\$1,219
Military forces (1998)	As at August 1st 1998 the active armed forces numbered some 450,000, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Some 320,000 were conscripts, the majority of them (250,000) in the army. Conscription is selective, and service is for three years. The army numbered 320,000 in total. The navy numbered 20,000 (of whom 10,000 were conscripts), the air force 30,000 and the air defense command 80,000. Reserves numbered 254,000, while the paramilitary included 150,000 in the Central Security Forces and 60,000 in the National Guard.
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	Exports to: Imports from: Italy 15 US 20 US 12 Germany 10 UK 9 Italy 7 Germany 5 France 7
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral 1,933.3 Multilateral 225.2 Total 2,212.0 of which: of which: of which: US 725.0 IDA 67.4 grants 1,870.1 Germany 442.4 EC 97.9 Japan 201.3 Arab countries 53.6 NOTE: Egypt additionally secures about \$1.3 billion per year in military aid from the United States
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	<p>Islamist militant groups will remain cowed, but the government will maintain tight political control and this will contribute to a rise in social discontent. Egypt will push for stronger Arab co-ordination to promote a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.</p> <p>The absence of militant Islamist attacks over the past year suggests that the Luxor massacre in November 1997 was an isolated incident rather than the start of a new campaign, and that the government's more focused security policy is working. But this does not preclude the possibility of further one-off attacks, as severe grievances against the government still exist. Ruthless and sustained state attack has almost eliminated the armed militant groups on the ground, and their leadership is deeply divided as to the wisdom of continuing on the path of violence. They are therefore little more than a security problem for a deeply entrenched regime that wields enormous powers of and is backed by powerful and privileged armed forces.</p>
Foreign policy	<p>The US embassy bombings have focused attention on Egypt's militant exiles. Relations with Sudan and Israel have remained tense, but Egypt's mediation efforts in the dispute between Turkey and Syria have proved successful.</p> <p>Failure to agree on measures to reduce support for militancy will ensure that relations with Sudan remain tense, but the main issue for Cairo is one of water security. Its overwhelming concern is to maintain the territorial integrity of Sudan, as an independent South Sudan might not feel bound by the existing Nile water-sharing agreement and may echo demands by other riparian states, such as Ethiopia and Uganda, for a redistribution of Nile waters. Egypt remains suspicious of the Islamist regime in Sudan, accusing it of funding and training militant groups within Egypt. The two countries are also embroiled in a bitter dispute over the border region of Halaib.</p> <p>Relations with Libya have become closer during Mr. Mubarak's tenure. Despite concern over the nature of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's rule, Egypt views Libya as an important source of work for its excess labor force and a useful buffer against Islamist extremism in the region.</p>

	Egypt's entry into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) in June 1998 serves to highlight its push to revive neglected trade ties with Africa. A major focus of foreign policy is to open up new export markets. The stress on upgrading African relations also has another dimension: Egypt's sole source of fresh water, the Nile, runs through nine other riparian states, and Cairo is likely to have to make water agreements with all of them eventually.
--	--

(Source: EIU Country Profile 1998-99 and 4th Quarter 1998 Country Report)

Kenya

Variables	Facts
Population (1997)	29 million
GDP (1997)	\$10 billion
GDP/capita	\$357
Military forces (1997)	Army 20,500 Navy 1,200 Air force 2,500 Total 24,200
Main trading partners (% of total, 1997)	Exports to: Imports from: Uganda 15.1 South Africa 11.4 Tanzania 13.7 UK 11.3 UK 11.5 UAE 10.0 Germany 6.4 Japan 7.5
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral 345.7 Multilateral 263.0 Total incl others 606.1 of which: of which: Japan 92.8 IDA 145.5 grants 400.5 Germany 53.5 EU 40.8 UK 43.8 fDF 48.4 Netherlands 39.9 US 11.0
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	<p>The Kenyan government is well placed to pursue its economic policies. The the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU)succession issue, and the related reform of the constitution, will dominate the political agenda. After a year in which poor weather and economic mismanagement conspired together to produce a severe downturn across most sectors, the indications are that 1999 will see a modest recovery to 1.6% real growth.</p> <p>The government's position has been substantially strengthened with the resounding defeat of a no-confidence motion in parliament. Once again a divided opposition lost the day. The commission investigating clashes in the Rift Valley and coastal areas prior to the 1992 and 1997 elections has heard evidence strongly linking senior KANU officials with the violence. President Moi has been presented with, but has yet to make public, a report on the competence of his suspended anti- corruption boss, John Harun Mwau.</p> <p>North-eastern Kenya, a wild and lawless place at the best of times, experienced a dramatic flare-up of violence at the end of October 1998 in which between 150 and 300 people died. In the district of Wajir, Dagodia villagers (who are ethnic Somalis), were attacked by their long-time adversaries, the Boran, with the assistance, the Dagodia maintain, of Oromos from over the Ethiopian border. Reports speak of around 50 people kidnapped, many of them teenage girls.</p>
Foreign policy	<p>Kenya has been positioning itself as an island of political stability amid the turmoil, which has not gone unnoticed by the US administration. Political and military tensions between the three economic powers of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) have long been strained by personal animosity between their leaders. Mr. Moi and Mr Museveni were particularly mistrustful of each other's style of leadership, and Tanzania's disastrous brush with African socialism was a world apart from Kenya's pro-Western, if not exactly liberal, economic policies. But those animosities are largely a thing of the past. In mid-1998, as a</p>

	demonstration of the new spirit of co- operation, 1,500 soldiers from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania took part in a joint training exercise in the desert terrain of northern Kenya. The one- month exercise, condemned Natural Fire, was undertaken with the assistance of the US army.
--	--

Uganda

Variables	Facts
Population (1997)	23 million
GDP (1997)	\$6.3 billion
GDP/capita	\$280
Military forces (1997)	UPDF 40,000-55,000 Paramilitary Air Wing 600 Paramilitary Marine Unit 400 Total 41,000-56,000
Main trading partners (% of total, 199)	Exports to: % Imports from: % Spain 21 Kenya 29 France 11 UK 12 Germany 9 India 6 Netherlands 9 Japan 6 Italy 7 Germany 6
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	Bilateral 369.9 Multilateral 305.6 Total incl others 677.5 of which: of which: of which: UK 69.4 IDA 115.7 grants 478.4 Denmark 68.0 EU 57.5 Germany 40.4 ADF 35.4 US 29.0 IMF 13.6 Japan 26.9
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	<p>The military involvement of Uganda's security forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo has dangerous potential for the country's internal security problems and is expected to pose a major challenge for President Museveni's leadership. Rebels attacked Kasese and terrorists blew up buses in urban areas. Parliament has rejected a cease-fire with the rebels, but an amnesty law seems to be on the cards. Uganda's northern rebel groups -- the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBFB) and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) -- will continue to plague Mr. Museveni's rule. The continuing absence of a central authority in eastern Congo will also mean greater freedom for the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) in western Uganda.</p> <p>The president's standing in the country is still strong and he is trusted. The ADF claim to have tried to assassinate him has drawn attention to the absence of a clear successor, adding to the prevailing uncertainty. The possible consequences of a power vacuum in Uganda would be far-reaching, and a return to the near-anarchic conditions of the early 1980s is not entirely inconceivable.</p>
Foreign policy	<p>Uganda's involvement in Congo has turned sour, as the Ugandan People's Defense Front backed the Congo rebels against the forces of President Kabila. A Congo-Sudan axis has threatened Uganda's security in the north. President Museveni has justified Uganda's policies and rallied the nation. There was opposition in parliament, but MPs ultimately backed the president.</p> <p>The Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, is making the right kind of diplomatic noises about wanting a peaceful solution to the crisis, but he is determined not to compromise on Uganda's security. Ugandan forces will not be withdrawn from Congo, and certainly not from border areas, until he is satisfied that the problem of security has been solved, which will not be a short-term decision. The problem in Congo has the potential to disrupt relations between the countries even beyond the Great Lakes region. If Congo and Sudan succeed in making common cause against Uganda, as they say they intend, the boost</p>

	<p>that this would give to the Ugandan rebel groups in the north would make life much more difficult for the Ugandan Peoples' Defense Force (UPDF) and the local population.</p> <p>A permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation (EAC) was officially launched in Arusha, Tanzania, in March 1996 and has kept itself busy. From July 1st 1996, the currencies of the three countries have been convertible, but progress in other areas has been slow. Claims that Kenya and Tanzania have been breaking the sanctions policy against Burundi and that Ugandan rebels have been operating in Tanzania have cast doubts on the political solidarity of the EAC.</p>
--	--

Ethiopia

Variables	Facts																																										
Population(1998)	58 million																																										
GDP (1997)	\$5.4 billion																																										
GDP/capita	\$93.1																																										
Military forces (1998)	Ethiopian armed forces 120,000 (Estimated figure since 1993; to be treated with caution.)																																										
Main trading partners (% of total, 1996)	<table><tr><td>Exports to</td><td>%</td><td>Imports from</td><td>%</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>26.4</td><td>Italy</td><td>11.6</td></tr><tr><td>Japan</td><td>10.9</td><td>US</td><td>10.8</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>10.3</td><td>Germany</td><td>7.0</td></tr><tr><td>UK</td><td>7.7</td><td>Saudi Arabia</td><td>3.6</td></tr></table>	Exports to	%	Imports from	%	Germany	26.4	Italy	11.6	Japan	10.9	US	10.8	Italy	10.3	Germany	7.0	UK	7.7	Saudi Arabia	3.6																						
Exports to	%	Imports from	%																																								
Germany	26.4	Italy	11.6																																								
Japan	10.9	US	10.8																																								
Italy	10.3	Germany	7.0																																								
UK	7.7	Saudi Arabia	3.6																																								
Official development assistance (ODA) (\$ million, 1996)	<table><tr><td>Bilateral</td><td>445.4</td><td>Multilateral</td><td>404.0</td><td>Total</td><td>849.4</td></tr><tr><td>of which:</td><td></td><td>of which:</td><td></td><td>of which:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>40.3</td><td>ADF</td><td>78.6</td><td>grants</td><td>622.7</td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>81.4</td><td>EU</td><td>51.8</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>US</td><td>56.0</td><td>IDA</td><td>127.5</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Japan</td><td>50.2</td><td>WFP</td><td>46.4</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>60.2</td><td>UNICEF</td><td>18.0</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>	Bilateral	445.4	Multilateral	404.0	Total	849.4	of which:		of which:		of which:		Italy	40.3	ADF	78.6	grants	622.7	Germany	81.4	EU	51.8			US	56.0	IDA	127.5			Japan	50.2	WFP	46.4			Netherlands	60.2	UNICEF	18.0		
Bilateral	445.4	Multilateral	404.0	Total	849.4																																						
of which:		of which:		of which:																																							
Italy	40.3	ADF	78.6	grants	622.7																																						
Germany	81.4	EU	51.8																																								
US	56.0	IDA	127.5																																								
Japan	50.2	WFP	46.4																																								
Netherlands	60.2	UNICEF	18.0																																								
Outlook for 1999-2000 & Political stability	Fighting with Eritrea is likely to flare up again. Diplomatic peace initiatives do not offer much hope, although a solution may emerge from the OAU. The conflict and expulsions raise legal questions over citizenship and property rights in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) will strengthen relations with Somali factions and Sudan. Economic reforms will improve relations with donors. Expected good harvests will ease food security worries in Ethiopia until 2000.																																										
Foreign policy	<p>The government is trying to build support for its conflict with Eritrea. The war has displaced 200,000 Ethiopians. Reports of expulsions continue. Opposition groups may take the opportunity to attack government forces. Not only has Ethiopia started to strengthen relations with Somali leaders for fear of attacks during a period of weakness, but relations with Sudan will also be affected by the conflict with Eritrea. Going by the Horn of Africa's time-honored principle that "your enemy's enemy is your friend", Ethiopian diplomats will now swiftly consolidate relations with the Sudanese government. The Eritrean government finally accepted an OAU peace proposal on 1 March 1999, which Ethiopia had earlier accepted.</p> <p>After taking power in 1991 the EPRDF government assumed a leading role in regional relations. Several regional diplomatic initiatives were conducted in conjunction with the TPLF's erstwhile rebel allies, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). These included ongoing negotiations in the Sudanese and Somali conflicts, notably within the context of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). However, Eritrea and Ethiopia's diplomatic alliance broke down in May 1998, when a trade and border disagreement escalated precipitously into full-scale war.</p>																																										